Coercive Diplomacy: Venezuela, Iran, and . . . Greenland?

- So we are going to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper, and judicious transition. And it has to be judicious because that's what we're all about.

- It's Tuesday, January 6th, 2026. And welcome back to "Goodfellows," a Hoover Institution broadcast examining history, economics, and matters of geopolitical importance. I'm Bill Whalen. I'm a Hoover Distinguished Policy Fellow, and I'll be your moderator today. Looking forward to a spirited conversation featuring three of my colleagues whom we jokingly refer to as the "Goodfellows." I'm referring of course to the historian Sir Niall Ferguson, economist John Cochrane, and former presidential national security advisor, Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster. Gentlemen, a belated happy New Year, and here we are only three weeks off, and once again, the world is on fire here. Let's talk about two things that are going right well. We're gonna talk about Venezuela, obviously, and time permitting, we will talk a little bit about Iran. If we don't get very deep into Iran, fear not, we have another show next week, so perhaps we could pick up where we left off. So let's begin with Venezuela, and H. R., I turn to you because you have kind of a unique perspective here. When you were in the Army, you served in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein, so you've seen what it's like for a society to undergo this kind of change. But in 2017, there you were in the White House advising Donald Trump about matters of geopolitical importance. I took the opportunity and the time off, H. R., to read your excellent book once again, "At War with Ourselves," and I turned the Goodfellows' attention to page 204. Allow me to read this passage to you. Look at Niall smiling. He loves it when we talk about our books here. Quote, here's what you wrote. You're referring to then secretary of state Rex Tillerson, H. R. "Before we left the room, Tillerson said, 'Mr. President, please don't say anything about military options for Venezuela.' As we walked past the swimming pool on the way to the press pool, I said, 'Rex, you know that he is a contrarian, and now the first thing he is going to say about Venezuela is that we are considering military options.' Sure enough, when a reporter asked Trump about Venezuela, he said, 'Venezuela is not very far away, and the people are suffering, and they're dying. We have many options for Venezuela, including a possible military operation, if necessary.' Asked if it would be a U.S.-led military operation, Trump said, 'We don't talk about it, but a military operation, a military option is certainly something that we would pursue.'" And then H. R. writes in parentheses, "There were no military options under consideration." So H. R., that was August of 2017. Here we are in January, 2025. There was a military option, it was pursuit. Two questions for you, my friend. Number one, what happened over that nearly eight years that led us to the military invasion? Secondly, I assume you approve of the choice of going in and taking out Maduro and his wife, returning them to the US for a trial. But my question is, does this pass the McMaster standard, which is don't start something unless you have an exit strategy?

- Well, you know, there's a lot of consistency with President Trump between Trump one and Trump two, because he used to say, "Hey, hey, General, General, you know, we're all the way over there fighting in Afghanistan, and Venezuela, it's just, it's right there. It's right there." So, he would be in conversations with leaders in the region who were highlighting, you know, the devastating effect that Maduro had had on the Venezuelan population. You know, now we're up to 8 million refugees. But he was talking to people like, you know, Santos in Colombia, for example, or he was talking to Mexican leaders, you know, prior to Lopez Obrador coming in to Mexico, the PRI leaders in Mexico. And so he heard it from a lot of regional leaders. He learns conversationally like that. But I think what's happened is really with the Biden administration's decision not to secure the southern border, and the continued exodus, mass exodus of Venezuelans, many of whom were coming into the country illegally, and Maduro was taking advantage of that to export much of his organized crime networks into the United States. This really just heightened Trump's desire to do something about this problem. Now, what also you see with President Trump in this decision to launch this extremely complicated and highly successful raid to arrest Maduro and his wife, what you also see with him is he wants to make a deal first, right? So he thought that he could make a deal maybe with Maduro. He sent, remember, you know, Grenell down as his special envoy initially to negotiate the release of some unlawfully detained Americans. And then also to get, you know, to have a conversation about some kind of an accommodation with Maduro. But Maduro turned out to be intransigent, like the Iranians were intransigent when he tried to get a deal with them, and then joined into the very successful IDF 12 day campaign with the strikes on the deep buried nuclear facilities. So I see a lot of consistency here, Bill, rather than a break from the past with President Trump.

- But the exit strategy, and I want Niall and John to weigh in here, is this regime change? Are we putting in a new regime? Or are we gonna see Maduro 2.0? So Niall, do you wanna take that?

- Well, I think first of all, let's give some historical perspective going back even before 2017, because it's clear that when the National Security Strategy came out, it said something very important that many commentators missed, and that was its annunciation of the Trump corollary. By putting the Western Hemisphere first in the ordering of priorities, the National Security Strategy broke new ground. But to me, the most remarkable thing was the expression of the Trump corollary because the Roosevelt corollary, dating back to 1904, was Theodore Roosevelt's assertion that the corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, that non-American powers could not become involved in the politics of the Americas, was that if a government in the Caribbean or Latin America was badly run, the United States reserved the right to intervene to sort it out. So when that National Security Strategy came out in November, to me, that was the big takeaway, and it turned out not to take many weeks for the Trump corollary to be put into action. And I do think that that's a really important starting point for this conversation, because what do we know from the history of the Roosevelt corollary? The history of the Roosevelt corollary was that the United States repeatedly intervened in Haiti, in Nicaragua, in Panama, creating the state of Panama in effect, and in Cuba. And each of these interventions had all kinds of complications. It's very difficult to come in and get rid of the president you don't like, and then create the present that you do like, and expect it all to run smoothly. So I think there are two points really. One, you can't detract from the boldness and the immaculate execution. Hats off to the CIA, to Delta Force, and I think to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Caine. This has been an exemplary show of force. And it's hard to believe that any of America's competitors amongst the authoritarian states could do anything remotely as impressive as this. But, but as Colin Powell used to say, "You break it, you do own it." It's not at all clear what comes next. And to answer your question directly, Bill, the administration does not seem to want to bring in the opposition, the legitimate democratically elected politicians who could govern, or at least would aspire to govern Venezuela. They wanna deal with the remnants of the Chavista regime that Maduro inherited from Hugo Chavez, and that is, I think, gonna be a very tricky thing to pull off given the fact that that regime is shot through, not only with corruption and criminality, but also with support from Cuba, from China, from Russia, from the bad guys. It's hard to believe that there really is a stable deal to be done with the remnants of the Maduro regime, in my view.

- Well, let me offer a gloomier forecast, and this is a trial balloon to be shot down by my fellow Goodfellows. And first of all, yes, amazed at the competence and execution of our armed forces. H. R., your buddies really know what they're doing. 32 to zero against the Cuban defenders of Maduro is spectacular. I think they have in mind, you know, the less, they don't want another Iraq, they don't want another Afghanistan. They wouldn't mind another Libya. This was not a coup. We didn't orchestrate a coup. We didn't put somebody new in. It was not an invasion. There's no Americans on the ground. We didn't force a different order. We simply removed one leader, and left intact whoever's there. Well, I'm channeling Rubio here, who seems like the architect of what's going on. And basically the lesson I'm seeing is, look, we don't care what happens in your, channeling Trump, outhouse country. They don't regard other countries very nicely. You can keep your little left wing kleptocracy if you want, so long as you kick out Cuba, Russia, Iran, China, and sort of do what we say. Other than that, we don't care. Go at it. Now, we're in a moment of great volatility, and what I foresee here is the knives come out. Well, let's look at the players. There's the old regime, which they have, they now need to consolidate very quickly 'cause they understand if they lose power, it's not gonna be a pleasant little retirement in Dubai or a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It's gonna be really unpleasant if they lose power, so they're gonna fight like crazy. There's about a third of the country run by whatever we call narco-terrorist gangs, and they understand they need to control territory and get along with their government. They're gonna fight like crazy. There's ordinary people who hate number one and number two, but, you know, rising up is very difficult. There's the opposition group who has, of course, all the moral authority and the backing of all the aircraft carriers that Belgium can provide. I'm being sarcastic there. But they do also have the backing of the diaspora, who also hates the current regime, so they can put up quite a bit of a fight. So that looks like a recipe for civil war and chaos. And I don't see any likelihood of the US putting boots on the ground and actually doing something, especially once the window of opportunity for a swift, here's who's in charge, get used to it, has passed, and that opportunity will pass very quickly. So that's the gloomy forecast. The one optimistic forecast I've heard is that the Venezuelans have a memory of democracy, prosperity, a functioning economy. So it's not like going into Afghanistan, which is essentially a medieval country and saying, "Here, hold elections and everything's gonna be fine," which that's not gonna happen. And especially the diaspora and the civil society still exists. So I do have hope that that can reemerge, but it doesn't look like it's gonna be pleasant or have much US intervention, so long as they do what we want on foreign policy.

- Hey, Bill, about your question. I agree with, you know, with John and Niall. You know, really what you see President Trump doing is trying to pursue an alternative to really what would be necessary to affect a change in the nature of the government in such that the constitution's restored, and the Venezuelan people regain their sovereignty, sovereignty that they, you know, they expressed their will in the last election. Over 70% of them voted Maduro out. But of course he has the tools of coercion still, the armed forces, and then these sort of brigades of Brownshirts. And as John alluded to and Niall alluded to, this is essentially a criminalized patronage network that he sits at the top of. It is a narco-terrorist network, but it's also a criminalized network that has created dependencies among a lot of Venezuelans on that socialist government remaining in power. That has to be broken for there to be real reform. What President Trump is doing is what is often termed, you know, coercive diplomacy or forceful persuasion, because he doesn't want to do what he regards as like regime change, nation building. These are dirty words in his mind because he's viewing Venezuela largely through the lens of the difficulties that we encountered in Afghanistan and in Iraq, I think, and a misdiagnosis of what the lessons were in those wars, from my view. But to be successful in coercive diplomacy, you have to have clear objectives. You know, what are the objectives? They talked about behavior of the regime, rather than the nature of the regime. It's narcotics trafficking, it's giving a platform for our adversaries in the region. It's the subsidization of far left political movements and what I would call like progressive authoritarian dictatorships in the region, including Cuba and Nicaragua, for example. There are a whole list of behaviors that we want to change. So, what are we demanding? And then the second is, how do we create a sense of urgency among the elites there to meet our demands? What kind of, you know, what kind of punishment are we willing to issue? Remember you said to the vice president, "It's gonna be worse for you than it is for Maduro." But are there other inducements being offered? But like John and I think Niall, I don't see any fundamental change in the behavior of this government until the nature of the government changes, and the one thing that we didn't mention is there is also kind of an ideological dimension to this as well that runs through the Chavistas. And so, you know, I don't think they're gonna fire themselves, you know. I think it's gonna take a lot more to get the outcome in Venezuela I think we would want to see, which is sovereignty restored to the Venezuelan people.

- But H. R., we seem to tolerate narco-terrorist states all over the world. Like everything from Southern Mexico through Colombia, you know, parts of it. We tolerate horrendous undemocratic regimes in Yemen, Somalia, huge human suffering without interfering, so long as they're not bothering us other dimensions. So I am completely with you on what I wish would be the case, and I wish the democratic opposition takes over quickly, but I don't see the US forcefully doing that, and there's really no one to negotiate with in Venezuela.

- Well, I think what you're gonna see is continued pressure on cash flow to the regime associated with the narcotics trafficking. That's why, you know, they're destroying the boats. And then also I think you're gonna see the seizure of more of these oil tankers. I think with Venezuela, it's clear that, you know, the cartel that Maduro's the head of is interconnected with the cartels in Mexico, is a big part of their cashflow and their strength, and their abilities you're alluding to, John, as mentioned. I mean, they control 30% of the territory in Mexico, and they control more than their narcotics trafficking. They control about also 30% of retail fuel sales in Mexico as well. They're gaining more and more power. And I think President Trump, that's next on his list. He mentioned Petro in Colombia as well. And I think the way President Trump looks at this is that they're poisoning Americans, right? It really is like his engagement against these cartels is, from his perspective, an America first approach. And he sees the poison of Americans as essentially acts of war. So I think you're gonna see a lot more pressure on the Mexicans. What the Mexicans I should do, and they actually are doing, is allowing a higher degree of cooperation with US law enforcement, and I think increasingly it'll be military forces and advisors as well. The question is, you know, does the Mexican government have the political will to take on the cartels? I think that's the big question.

- Gentlemen, why does the president keep talking about oil? I know that energy is a big part of the strategy and the MAGA vision, but when asked about Venezuela, rather than talking about human rights, rather than talking about drug trafficking, he keeps going back to oil.

- We're going to have our very large United States oil companies, the biggest anywhere in the world, go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, the oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country.

- Hey, he loves to talk about oil. Okay, now, even the Syrian civil war, there's a lot of conduit here as well. But I would also say that when you look at what was a precedent for this, and maybe Niall will have some, and John will thought some thoughts on this as well, which is the Panama invasion in 1989. You had the same confluence of issues. You had really a narcotics, you know, trafficking head of state who was indicted by the United States, a criminal head of state, but also you had a country with significant strategic value. In this case it wasn't oil, it was the Panama Canal. But in Venezuela, Venezuela sits on top of the largest oil reserves in the world. And so Trump looks at that and he says, do I really want, you know, Venezuela to be aligned with China, with Russia, to be underwriting the Cuban Army's dictatorship in Cuba with shipments of free or, you know, low cost oil to Cuba, for example. He just put pressure on Mexico for the same thing. So I see kind of some continuities there, and it's really the strategic value of the country is what he sees, and oil is the main reason for that.

- Two things. I mean, one is that, as H. R. says, this is how Trump rolls. There's always supposed to be a business angle, whether we're dealing with the Middle East, or Europe, or Russia. This is one of the light motifs of Trump's style. That's why I came up with the term of real-estate politik as opposed to realpolitik, because for Donald Trump, realism is there's a deal to be done. But there's a strategic dimension too, since Venezuela's oil resources were being accessed by China, rather than serving any benefit to the United States. You can understand the desire to put an end to that. And I do think we have to understand this Venezuelan move, not just in the context of the Western Hemisphere, but in its global context, as striking a blow at a weak spot within the axis of authoritarians, in the same way that hitting Iran last year struck at a weak spot. And from the vantage point of Xi Jinping, this is galling. From the vantage point of Vladimir Putin too. Venezuela has been an asset for those guys. The question is, does this then legitimize their claims on territories in their vicinity? Notably Ukraine, in the case of Russia. Taiwan, in the case of China. Just before this operation happened, just days before, the Chinese organized a huge naval and air display of force.

- Really live fire exercise, Niall.

- Really?

- Yeah.

- It was of the largest that we have seen in recent years in terms of its scale. So I think the other interesting question that we should talk about is where does this lead? Not just in Venezuela, because it's clear that the situation in Venezuela is very fluid and unstable. But there are all sorts of ramifications in the rest of the world. And not content with this extraordinary move in Caracas, President Trump then turns his attention to Greenland and sets the hair of the Europeans ablaze. Now, I think my own view is that this is something of a diversionary tactic, and that we've seen this before. President Trump likes to raise flammable issues when he's doing something decisive. I'd personally be very surprised if the United States does anything remotely dramatic with respect to Greenland, beyond some possible diplomatic overtures. But I think this is a big global game that's being played here, and President Trump is good at this game, but his adversaries are also capable of playing it too. And I wonder, H. R., if you expect there to be consequences that can't necessarily be controlled by the United States in the coming weeks and months.

- Hey, well, Niall, just first to your point about the degree to which this could be viewed as some kind of an equivalence with what, you know, with what China would wanna do with Taiwan, or with what Russia's done to Ukraine. I think this is where we have to get much better at our diplomatic messaging, our public diplomacy to say, hey, look, this guy was an indicted, you know, criminal who stole the election from the Venezuelan people, who extinguished freedom there, and this is a unique circumstance. I wish we'd be better at that. But the more we just talk about like the oil and these other issues, it really does, it really does really seed of some of the high ground, at least for some people around the world. And then, you know, I do think that what's really happening here is something that's quite the opposite of what the National Security Strategy was. Remember everybody was like, hey, he didn't talk about great power competition in the National Security Strategy. But what drew him in, I think, in part to Venezuela is, as you pointed out, the fact that it had been a platform, a platform for Russia and China. What draws him to agreement is the competition in the Arctic. With who? Well, with Russia and China. And so Trump is a lot less isolationist than maybe some of the people in his administration, and if you follow what he does, right, instead of maybe what was just in that strategy or what he says from time to time, I think that's the right way to do it. I agree with you, I don't think he's gonna do anything with Greenland, but I hope what this does is open the door for more cooperation with Denmark and with NATO to maybe strengthen our military presence there, you know, and go back to where it was maybe 20 years ago.

- I wanna add a couple comments on oil, drugs and Greenland. Of course, I don't think Vladimir Putin cares one bit, and Xi Jinping, about legitimacy and into the finer points of international law, as evidenced by their reaction, so I wouldn't worry about that too much. The oil is interesting, but I don't think we're going after for oil. The reports I saw, heard is that this is basically how they sold it to Trump. Venezuela's oil will take a long time to come on time. It needs a lot of investment under a stable regime, that's gonna take a while to come. It's kind of funny, we would be, if anything, we would be subsidizing foreign imports, which are gonna low cost and undercut the US producers in Permian Basin. Not exactly the usual Trump thing. But there's a sadness to this. The era of free trade meant that you didn't have to own countries, you could buy stuff when you needed. And going to the era when trade is used as a geostrategic competition forces countries to say, well, I need to own things by force, which is too bad. Drugs. If that's the central issue here, the prospect of the United States using enough force to take back a huge swath of Central and Latin America, that takes huge boots on the ground. The countries there don't have the forces to do it. The prospect of us starting a war like that and winning it seemed very low. This is, if I wanna express a very unpopular opinion, our war on drugs is tremendously costly. Imagine drugs were legal in the US, what would happen? More US people would be zonked out on drugs. That's the cost. There would be a lot less overdoses 'cause we'd be getting cheap, free drugs, well made, well proportioned drugs. There would be a lot less crime 'cause drugs would be free. And a swath of the rest of the world, we'd undercut the narco-terrorists and we could take back that swath of the rest of the world. The costs of our drug policy are very high, and if the alternative is we're gonna go literally start a war with US boots on the ground to take those areas back, that seems very costly. My last comment, Greenland. We ought to also go back to the old fashioned practice, Alaska, of buying things rather than talking about wars. There's 50,000 people in Greenland. $50 billion is a cheap price for Greenland. That's a million bucks each. Staple it to a green card and a condo in Miami, I think we got Greenland in about 20 minutes. You know, there's a deal to be had there.

- I think he's got something like that in mind, honestly, I really do, John, honestly.

- Well, I wanna appeal to the real estate developer in Trump and say why bother threatening the US Marines for the cost of sending one aircraft carrier up there, which would be about $50 billion. I'm making up numbers. You could buy the place outright.

- Niall, I'm curious about the Russian mindset these days. I don't know if you saw the tweet put out by the Russian Foreign Minister, who blasted the United States for invading a sovereign nation, which I assume he's just irony impaired. But then there was a story the other day, Niall, which suggested that Russia offered the United States a deal, kinda like the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis where the Soviet Union took out the missiles from Cuba, and we took out the missiles from Jupiter, from Turkey. And the Russian proposal was that if we take our hands off Ukraine, they'll take their hands off Venezuela.

- Well, I read the same report that this was thrown out at some point. I'm not sure how far that ever went.

- Right.

- And one must bear in mind that a lot of the commentary that we hear around these issues is pretty unreliable, because in truth, what has gone on in the last few weeks, as H. R. will confirm, is unknown to journalists and cannot be known to journalists because it's in the realm of highly classified information. It'll be many years really before historians can say what happened. I'll give you a good example. Why did Trump decide not to back the opposition? Because he felt he should have won the Nobel Prize. That is almost certainly nonsense, but it's the kind of thing that, you know-

- That's kind like Maureen Dowd writing that George Bush went into, the younger George Bush went into Iraq because he wanted to avenge the father.

- Exactly.

- Lemme chime in on that one. It's obvious why Russia made that offer. Russia's got nothing to give. The idea that Russia has all sorts of spare military equipment, money and other stuff to send to Maduro is fanciful. In fact, this is a great moment. Sort of the axis of evil is running outta money. Iran, what do they have to give the Venezuelans? Nothing. What do the Cubans have to give the Venezuelans? This is gonna cut off a lot of oil to Cuba, which is, you know, gonna get out for that one. So with the exception of China, which has its own problems, you know, it's easy for them to say, well, we're gonna, we'll offer something to you and, you know, we'll stop supporting Venezuela if you X, Y, and Z. That seems like a free offer.

- Yeah, it's important, 'cause Niall mentioned this too about the axis of authoritarians, acts of aggressors. But you know what, really, I think we're seeing them in a profoundly weak position, and this is where I hope that President Trump kind of sees kind of the reaction, the reaction that happened in China. They went to their highest level of cyber alert in China. They shut down any kind of message that had to do with Venezuela. And just a reminder that Xi Jinping likes to appear strong, you know, but who does he fear more than anything else? His own people, you know. How about the growing protests in Iran? They're not the same scale as they were after Mahsa Amini's murder, but they're widespread and they're continuing. And then Bill, you pointed out to us, you know, that they're gonna pay, you know, Iranians a stipend of $7 a month, you know, to try to placate 'em. I mean, so I think, you know, that is, Iran really is in a position of profound weakness at this moment. Their currency has collapsed. Tehran is running out of water, you know. And so I think, I hope that, what I hope is that President Trump will also realize that Putin is in a position of profound weakness. Part of Putin's ruse with President Trump is that he's got something to offer us, a great deal. You know, if we can work together on some big issues, you know, economically we can work well together. And he tries to portray strength, you know, like an overwhelming Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, you know? So I hope that really what the weakness of, you know, really Maduro, the security around him, how we expose that, the ripple effect that we're seeing in these other authoritarian regimes also helps, you know, President Trump and others come to the realization that Putin is a position of profound weakness. And in fact, this competition with the axis of aggressors, you know, what Niall was calling the Cold War II, maybe we won already and we just don't even realize we've won.

- Well, I'd love to believe that we're winning Cold War II. I think it's a bit too early to draw that conclusion because the big one, the big showdown over Taiwan has yet to happen. And I think that's going to be the real test of who has the upper hand, not what happens in Venezuela or even in Iran.

- All right, we have two minutes left here, so one final topic here for you. What next in terms of what country should be worried? Would you put your money on Colombia or your money on Cuba?

- Cuba, I think Cuba is really worth watching at this point. Marco Rubio is secretary of state and national security advisor simultaneously. Nobody has done that since Henry Kissinger.

- Right.

- And he's in a very, very strong position at this point. This whole operation has his fingerprints on it. He was the one who was out there doing the shows at the weekend, explaining the rationale, moderating some of what President Trump had said in his presser. And I thought it was highly interesting what Rubio said about Cuba. So I think Cuba is the very obvious next shoe to drop, and that regime should be very worried.

- Isn't the most likely for pressure from the US Mexico and Colombia? Cuba for internal collapse. Are we gonna really start up again on the 1960s efforts against Cuba? That's a question. H. R., are we are gonna start again poisoning Castro?

- Work stack.

- Or just let it collapse, finally-

- They poisoned themselves, right? That economy's in collapse also based on, you know, the corruption of this dictatorship. And you know what, Venezuela was their lifeline. I mean, this is what's really important, you know. We talked about kind of the upstream support for Venezuela, you know, coming from China, coming from Russia, also coming from Cuba with some security assistance and so forth. How'd that worked out? Not really well for them. And from Iran. But how about all the downstream support that Venezuela provides, you know, in the region? I mean, really of a huge source of support for the Cuban army in Cuba. That's gone. How about Daniel Ortega? Daniel Ortega's in a really difficult position in Nicaragua. And then as you alluded to, I mean, Mexico is under pressure. You heard the president's statements about Petro and Colombia. Hey, there's an election there this year. I think what you're seeing, you're gonna see as kind of a broader movement in the hemisphere as well of a swinging of the pendulum back from the far left. There was a pink wave in the hemisphere in the last eight years or so, and it's gonna swing back because of the failure of these far left progressive governments. Already failed in Peru. Already failed in Chile. Petro is deeply unpopular in Colombia, as we've been talking about. Cuba and Nicaragua are in real positions of weakness. So I think that, you know, this could be a moment of opportunity. You had, you saw Trump's support for Milei in Argentina. Argentina finally may be able to stick with reforms long enough to finally turn the corner, and they're doing it with US support, which could be a model like Chile was, you know, decades ago. So I feel pretty good about the hemisphere now. I mean, there's gonna be more pressure on these governments. But there's also an opportunity at this moment to work with the US on some of these fundamental problems, economic problems, and the security issues associated mainly with narco-terrorist organizations, as the administration has labeled them.

- So, Niall, a historical question. When the Japanese government transitioned in 1945, what American oversaw the effort?

- Well, that was, of course, General MacArthur's responsibility.

- So as we look at Venezuela, perhaps we should be considering a current or former general to help with things. Can we think of anybody who might wanna spend some time at Caracas?

- But before we send H. R. to Venezuela, remember, the Roosevelt corollary meant not that we directly run those places, it meant that we determine who runs those places. So the Trump corollary is about finding a Venezuelan who can competently run Venezuela, and that, I think, that's an important distinction here. When Trump says we run it, he doesn't mean an American general is gonna run Venezuela. He means we're temporarily in charge until we find somebody to run it better than Maduro was running it, and I think that's a really important point. One last thought to add to that, 'cause I don't think analogies with Japan 1945 are at all-

- I was kidding, Niall.

- But you know, it's worth saying this is a very, very different thing that's being attempted here. Now, the Roosevelt corollary produced, as I mentioned earlier, multiple American interventions, and the results were mixed. Nobody could say Haiti turned out brilliantly, and in the case of Cuba, it all ultimately ended in the disaster of the Castro Revolution. I wonder if the Trump corollary is gonna go better. And I think maybe, for the reason H. R. just gave, maybe it could go better, because I think Latin America is much more in the mood to go in the direction of democracy, markets, rule of law, what we're seeing in Argentina, than was true back in 1904. So it might just be, dare one suggest it, that this is part of a major shift in the region as a whole, and that this time, it will work out better than it did the last time we brought the word corollary into diplomatic language.

- Let me have one last addition to Niall's view. The foreign support, sources of support have now dried up. You know, the axis of evil, except for China. China might have some money, but it's not, and the whole point was we're not gonna take that money from China, so. And their legitimacy has dried up. Look at the plot that Scott's gonna put up of GDP in Venezuela. And Milton Friedman's joke that if socialists took over Saudi Arabia, they would run out of sand is absolutely true. It's just a horrendous collapse. So that the 1950s, 1960s, you know, put on your red beret and how communism is gonna lead to great wonders for the people is I think pretty clearly false everywhere but some boroughs of New York City, where they seem to want to take that on. And certainly Latin America has caught on, we don't want to live like Venezuelans and Cubans, thank you very much.

- Hey, and one quick qualifier too to what we're talking about. I think what, you know, where interventions have been successful is when the US has provided the space for the people of those countries to then select their own leaders through a democratic process. This is what happened in Panama in 1989. It's what happened in Dominican Republic with Operation Power Pack in 1965. Now, it's important to consider the scale of these, right? In Dominican Republic, as small as that is, we had 42,000 troops there. We had about 30,000 in Panama. And Venezuela, you know, Venezuela is 10 times the population, 12 times the land mass of Panama. So to do something like decisive would be massive. And this is why I think President Trump is trying what he sees as an alternative to a massive intervention, coercive diplomacy, but as we were discussing earlier, there are limits to what can be achieved with coercive diplomacy, rolling on the great scholarship that a fantastic Stanford professor, the late Alexander George did years ago. He did a fantastic book, "The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy," and I have this great little pamphlet with me that he did years ago called "Forceful Persuasion." And he offers a very good framework, I think, for understanding what the Trump administration is trying to do. But also he offers really some warnings about the limits associated with coercive diplomacy.

- Yeah, because H. R., coercive diplomacy, you can get whoever's in charge to not talk to Cuba or China if you want. But as far as space for democracy to emerge, you've got a regime with all the guns, and all the police, and the state apparatus who understands they are gonna come to a horrible end if they lose power. You got narco-terrorists who are well armed, and they understand they're gonna come to a horrible end. There's just no, to have the kind of peace you need to even hold an election would require immense US military intervention. Ah, I don't see that happening.

- And if I can quote our colleague Stephen Kotkin. He says, "Hey, these authoritarian regimes, they don't have to be that strong, they just have to be stronger than any organized opposition."

- Yeah, North Korea.

- All right, gentlemen, let's move on to Iran. Sir Niall, I look at a country right now that is undergoing, I think it's in its 10th day now of domestic protests. 29 to 36 people have died. About 1,200 people arrested. It's spread to 11 provinces around the country. I'm looking at a nation, Niall, that is undergoing a genuine economic crisis that John can explain to us with its currency. I'm looking at a country that is gonna have a hard time getting money from the outside, and I'm looking at a country that may very well face further military actions from the United States and Israel in the very near future. Question, Sir Niall Ferguson. Year after year, we talk about this being the year that the theocracy is going to go under. Is this the year? And if you're the Supreme Leader, are you on the phone to Bashar al-Assad asking about real estate in Moscow?

- Well, H. R. already offered us a great segue with his Steve Kotkin impersonation, because what the Iranian regime shows time and time again is that no matter how terrible it is when it comes to economics, it is highly competent at repression. And we've now seen multiple protest movements ultimately snuffed out by the various police forces and security forces that the regime has at its command. And I won't really believe that the regime's in trouble until I see members of the security forces switching sides. I haven't seen that yet. So, much as I would love to see the regime gone, I think you have to keep reminding yourselves, we've seen videos like this before of courageous Iranians taking their grievances to the streets, confronting the authoritarian regime. But time and again, they're pushed back down and often very brutally. The key question is, what happens if Khamenei dies? This is a man now in his late eighties. We know that he has a price on his head, at least as far as some elements of the Israeli government are concerned. I think it's not obvious how the regime copes when he dies, because they don't have a succession plan. That I think is the thing that could make a difference at this point. It's his health, as it was the Shah's health in 1979 that proved critical in bringing down his regime. I think going back to H. R.'s point, it's possible that we could see an extraordinary sequence of events in the coming years. We must never rule out this kind of benign outcome where the United States reasserts its power self confidently, and the authoritarian regimes turn out to be very weak. I urge everybody to read Steve Kotkin's excellent new essay in "Foreign Affairs" on this point. The authoritarians are fragile in many ways, and the challenge that they face from President Trump is one that is very, very threatening to their viability. Even Russia is much weaker than Putin would like us to believe. So, you know, H. R., you may be right. Maybe Cold War II ends much more quickly than I think, because these regimes turn out to be so fragile.

- H. R., would Trump be so bold as to pull a Maduro on the Supreme Leader?

- Well, I think that what's been very positive is that he's come out in support of the protesters-

- Yes.

- And warned the regime, you know, "Hey, don't go after the protesters." So I think there would be consequences. I don't know what kind of consequences, you know, he has in mind. But just that statement is important, 'cause it's important to remember, last year was, you know, was a record year for executions of innocent people in Iran, the largest number since the Revolution and the civil war in '79 to '80. So I think, you know, I think it was important that President Trump made that statement, and I'm sure he has some kind of consequences in mind. I think one of those consequences might be an initiation of a second round of a sustained Israeli campaign against what remains of Iranian missile capabilities, as well as Iranian military leadership. Remember, the Israelis killed about 20 senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps generals during that 12 day campaign. So I think that's maybe what he has in mind is another campaign against leadership, and probably that would also include going after their missile program, the remnants of their missile program.

- Yeah, you know, revolutions succeed. The security forces don't have to change side. They just need the guys in the streets, they have to say, "I'm not gonna shoot any more civilians," and there comes, that moment can come. The one thing different than all the previous ones is we do have Trump's statement that he'll do something about it. We're not sure what. Along with the demonstration of especially Israel's capacity to go in and take out actual senior leaders, which could be the thing that provokes that moment to come.

- John, I know you love so-called helicopter drops of money. Your thoughts on the Iranian plans, so the idea here is you're gonna send about 80 million Iranians the equivalent of $7 US, unfortunately probably not US dollars, but Iranian currency. And according to "The New York Times," that would cover "the equivalent of around 100 eggs, a kilogram of red meat, or a few kilograms of rice or chicken at current prices in Iran."

- I'm reminded of contemporary proposals to print government money and send it to people to cure affordability in the US. I mean, Iran's currency is falling because Iran, the government of Iran is out of resources. It's printing money to cover its bills. And the more money it prints and hands out, the more the inflation goes up. There's only so much to go around, and not enough, so. It's kind of a funny plan and shows the level of their desperation.

- So here's the exit question for you. Is 2026 the year that the regime does go under? And does it implode or does it need a shove from some outside force, i.e. US-Israeli strikes?

- I think there will be Israeli strikes. There might even be additional US strikes. I don't think it's the year the regime falls though. That I'm reluctant to predict 'cause it doesn't feel like the base case anymore than in previous periods of popular protest.

- I think it depends. Niall's already mentioned, you know, Ayatollah Hamedani, he is 87 years old. There could be an event, an event that triggers a much more broader uprising. I think a lot of runners are just waiting for that guy to leave the scene. And then also you could have another form of catastrophe, you know, Iran's prone to earthquakes, but they've created their own disaster with, as I mentioned, the water shortage in Tehran. I mean, you know, the Iranian president said, "Well, maybe we'll just move the capital." Well, so I mean, I think there might just be a catastrophic failure of the government in this year as well.

- Yeah, I would look forward not just one year, but we're also concluding the first quarter of this century, which started, remember with jihad and Islamic terrorism, and an axis of evil that was Iran, North Korea and Russia, along with our disputes against China. It hasn't been a great 25 years, but I think the next 25 years are gonna be very different. China's the one that still seems to be chugging along, but the rest aren't doing that great. So sooner or later, Iran is gonna fall and come back to normalcy. Let's hope it's sooner rather than later. But as North Korea shows, if they're willing to be ruthless, they can keep going a long time into abject poverty.

- So I see in 2026, it could be wonderful for democracy and freedom if Venezuela transitions, if we do something with Cuba and Colombia, Iran ends its horrible theocracy. Conversely, I see a frustrating 2026 and that Venezuela becomes choppy and complicated. Iran stays status quo. Are you guys bearish or bullish on this concept? In other words, could this be ironically in the 250th anniversary of the United States founding, could it be a great year for freedom, or are you more in the camp of the status quo?

- Well, it would be wonderful, wouldn't it? And these things do happen. Let's not forget the 1980s, the ouster of Noriega from Panama was just a small part of an extraordinary story of political transformation that the United States led, most obviously in Eastern Europe. But I think the problem is partly Eastern Europe, because it's hard for me at this point to see the situation in 2026 getting better for Ukraine. I mean, I would love that it would, but it's highly unlikely because the odds are just against Ukraine in terms of manpower and firepower. I don't see China, to come back to something we talked about earlier, about to enter a crisis, even though one can see all kinds of problems in their economy, it doesn't feel like a crisis is looming there. If anything, the question is does Taiwan become a target for China this year or next year? And the last thing I'd add is let's not forget as we look ahead to 2026 that there is a sort of power of political gravity that affects all second terms in their second year. Because although we are excited by events in Venezuela, the public is not particularly excited about foreign policy compared with the bread and butter issues that they sum up with the word affordability. And so even although the United States are celebrating 250 years, and we would love to see all the authoritarians crash down right on cue, there's another quite plausible scenario in which they hold on, the United States doesn't find a magic solution to the problems of Venezuela, and the President's party then loses control of the house. I mean, that seems like a base case for 2026, not very inspiring and exciting, but it's probably the more likely scenario than the "they all lived happily ever" after version.

- John?

- I'm bearish short run and optimistic long run. You heard my worries about where Venezuela seems very likely to be headed towards a year of chaos. And as Niall points out, we are in, we're heading for the waning powers of the Trump administration. The Democrats will probably take over the Congress, and this kind of muscular foreign policy may not continue. But over the long run, you know, Venezuela is now free of Maduro, and I think out of the chaos, it's likely something good will come, and you know, same thing for Iran and other places, and we'll see about China.

- H. R., need I even ask if you're an optimist?

- I am, but I think we should also really heed Aristotle and focus on what we can control. That involves recognizing kind of the limits of what you can achieve abroad, but also the possibilities. And I think what we can control is we can strengthen our own nation. You know, how about reducing the vitriolic nature of our political discourse? You know, I think what emboldens our adversaries is they see us as weak, divided and decadent. Well, let's prove 'em wrong. Let's strengthen our country. I think there are a lot of positive indicators here with deregulation, with improvements in energy security, with the effect that artificial intelligences could potentially have on our economy. So I mean, there are a lot of tremendous possibilities that we can control ourselves. And also one of those is our relationships with allies and partners abroad. I think we ought to, you know, maybe make this year a year in which maybe we restore confidence in the US reliability internationally. And whereas we've been doing a lot of tough love, you know, with allies and partners in terms of responsibility, burden sharing and so forth. Let's emphasize maybe the kind of the love part of that as our interests and our principles kind of align. You know, so I just don't want us to miss opportunities in this next year, because I think there are tremendous opportunities and we should focus on what we can control to take advantage of them.

- Well said, and what an eventful 2026 it's going to be. Gentlemen, a great conversation, as always. I'd like to end the show on a note. I'd like to send a shout out to two friends of "Goodfellows." One is our friend Ben Sasse, the former Nebraska senator who was on "Goodfellows" just last month. Not long after he was on our show, the senator put out a statement saying that he was suffering from stage four pancreatic cancer. We wish him the best. If that's not bad enough, it gets even worse. A few days ago, our colleague Victor Davis Hanson, who as an office right across from H. R. in the Hoover Tower, he revealed that he'd undergone surgery for a cancerous tumor, which he characterizes the result of a "nine month odyssey to diagnose a major problem." I am right around the corner from Victor's assistant. Her name is Megan Ring, and she wears several bracelets on her right wrist, one of which is a very thin wrist that has written out in Morse code, pardon my language here, you have to bleep this. It says cancer, and to me that summarizes this. So I wish the senator and the classicist a healthy recovery, if at all possible. Gentlemen, your thoughts on Victor and Ben Sasse?

- Well, these are two men known for their intrepidity. They're taking on this disease with great courage. And I did have a chance to speak with Victor right before surgery, and you know, of course, his demeanor was exactly as you'd expect, you know, very, very, very stoic, courageous. And so obviously both of them are foremost in my thoughts and prayers.

- John?

- Likewise. Wonderful, thoughtful people from whom I've learned so much. Ben's, you gotta read Ben's statement on Twitter. I only hope I'm able to say something as wonderful in my own time. So even the resident atheist on the show is offering his prayers to both wonderful men.

- Niall?

- Well, the good news is that I think Victor's surgery went well, and the updates that I've received, and I've been checking in pretty much daily, are very encouraging. So that is some good news for all his admirers out there. For Ben Sasse, of course, it's a very grim prognosis, as he acknowledged in that extraordinarily moving statement that he issued. You know, one can pray for a miracle, and it's needed here because he's a young man, younger than all of us, and he still has children in their teens. He also has so much more that he could still contribute to this country. So I'm still reeling from that news. It was a very heavy blow for us all, and especially of course for Ben's family. So as a former atheist and now devout Christian, I can only urge everybody who's watching, listening, pray for Ben and his family because this is one of those occasions where, really, prayer is about all we've got.

- Okay, and let's leave it there, gentlemen. As I mentioned, "Goodfellows" will be back very soon, and we'll probably pick up with Iran and some few other topics. Subscribe to us, that's one way to make sure you don't miss us. On behalf of the "Goodfellows," Sir Niall Ferguson, H. R. McMaster, John Cochrane, and all of us here at the Hoover Institution, we hope you enjoyed this episode and we'll be back soon. Until then, take care. Thanks for watching. Thanks for listening.

- [Narrator] If you enjoyed this show and are interested in watching more content featuring H. R. McMaster, watch "Battlegrounds," also available at hoover.org.