Several events have driven relations between China and Taiwan recently. The first meeting in 10 years between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Strait (ARATS); the agreement to begin weekend cross-Strait passenger charter flights in early July and Mainland tourist travel to Taiwan two weeks later; and the atmospherics and leadership meetings accompanying Taiwan’s participation in the Olympics have all bolstered a sense of cross-Strait momentum. Despite the opposition DPP’s relentless attacks on Ma Ying-jeou’s cross-Strait policies, Ma and other senior officials have laid out the comprehensive policy rationales for their moves with the Mainland, and thus far they seem to be retaining popular support. At the same time, the administration has suffered a significant drop in overall support due to Taiwan’s poor economic performance. Economic recovery and cross-Strait relations will be inextricably intertwined, as the recovery will depend in important measure on greater involvement with the Mainland, while Ma’s ability to sustain the opening to the Mainland—and to forge a broad consensus for more difficult, political decisions on cross-Strait relations in the months ahead—will depend on his success in turning the economy around.
With regard to matters of “international space,” Ma’s call for a “diplomatic truce” may actually be bearing some fruit—at least for now. His low-key transits of the United States in late August, along with his successful stops in Latin America, have not provoked harsh PRC complaints. How Beijing will react to Ma’s new approach to the United Nations, however, remains to be seen. Meanwhile, Ma has continued to lay stress on restoring a relationship of trust with Washington, and those ties in the first few months of the Ma era have obviously improved over the Chen Shui-bian period. But it may take some time before a significant level of comfort is reintroduced into the relationship. Consistency on both sides could play an important part in achieving that, but so far it has been somewhat lacking. This has been seen, among other places, in connection with a looming issue that will affect relationships along all three legs of the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan triangle: the future of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Taken altogether, the first steps to restore exchanges between Taiwan and the Mainland are generally moving ahead smoothly, with more to come. Even in the economic area, however, some obstacles will likely arise in the months ahead, not to mention in the more sensitive political and security arenas.
