Why Putin Will Not Work For America As Ally Against China
Like Beijing, Moscow Wants To Dethrone, Not Strengthen The United States
Theoretically, two superpowers—the United States and Russia—should go after China, a rising contender, to preserve the established hierarchy. But it won’t happen. For an instructive historical lesson, go back to a comparable constellation when that master of manipulation, Henry Kissinger, failed to play China against the Soviet Union. The intent was to draw a much weaker and poorer China into the American orbit in order to pressure the Soviet Union, the world’s no. 2.
In Kissinger’s words: “We opened to China ... to introduce an additional element of calculation for the Soviets.” Translated: The U.S. would bribe China so that it would weigh in against Moscow and help the Nixon administration to arrange a graceful exit from Vietnam. Kissinger assumed that both “had the same objective.”1
They did not. China pocketed the gifts: the betrayal of Taiwan, a seat among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the opening of America’s markets. And China never did do America’s bidding. It did not position itself against the USSR, nor did it save the U.S. from humiliation in Vietnam. Today, Beijing is America’s worst rival in the contest over global primacy, not to speak of its predatory trade policy.
Could a different line-up among the three work today? Could America and a diminished Russia coalesce against the Beijing Behemoth? Yes, if the sun were to rise in the west. There are three structural problems that defy Russo-American collaboration.
One, as no. 1, the U.S. is wedded to the existing order, the foundation of its primacy. Yet China and Russia are revisionist powers who both want a much larger slice of the global pie.
How then would a grasping Russia act as handmaiden of status-quo America? The problem is not bad blood, but Mr. Putin’s ambition. One objective is to informally reconstitute the Soviet Empire by drawing former USSR republics as clients into an uncontested Russian sphere of influence. The second is to cast the shadow of Russian power over Moscow’s former satrapies in Eastern Europe from the Baltics to Bulgaria. The third quest is to weaken the trans-Atlantic bond between the U.S. and Europe. The fourth is to secure and expand Russia’s sway over the Middle East and North Africa. Basically, the game is to dislodge the U.S. wherever opportunity beckons.
Given this set of interests, how would Washington recruit Moscow against Beijing? There is nothing, save recognizing Russian sway over the “Stan” countries, that the U.S. could offer to gain the Kremlin’s good will. But If the U.S. were to yield on Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, it might just as well say good-bye to its global pre-eminence. There is no deal here because America cannot pay such a price.
Two, another reason why a U.S.-Russian partnership won’t materialize is structural as well. For Russia, the U.S. remain the foremost rival. So, it pleases Mr. Putin to play China against America. Nor is this a fanciful prospect. Moscow and Beijing have already fashioned an alliance of convenience. It is defined by routine, though often symbolic, military cooperation. Examples are joint exercises, joint air patrols over the Pacific, advanced Russian weapons sales, and the training of Chinese officers at Russian academies.2
Three, U.S.-Russian amity is limited because it makes much more sense for two revisionists to unite against the top dog than for Moscow to bandwagon with Washington. By analogy, recall the legendary American bank robber Willie Sutton. Why did he break into banks? He replied: “That’s where the money is.” The U.S. is the global bank, so to speak, with power and assets galore. To diminish and thus weaken no. 1 is a natural for nos. 2 and 3 who want more for themselves and less for the nation standing in their way. Rob and reap!
Finally, the non-structural factor of ideology. China and Russia need not fear domestic interference from each other, as both share the same authoritarian faith. From each other, they won’t have to worry about the kind of condemnation that emanates from democracies like the United States and threatens their domestic supremacy. In that respect, Putin and Xi, despots both, are cousins-in-crime with a strong interest in maintaining ideological solidarity.
The upshot: The United States won’t be able to set Russia against China, nor the other way around, as Kissinger tried in the 1970s. So, America must harness strategic friends elsewhere in order to construct the double-containment of nos. 2 and 3. Candidates are Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, and lesser Asian powers like Vietnam (a former Chinese colony) or Taiwan (a designated victim of Chinese imperialism). At best, Washington can play Beijing and Moscow only at the margins—with an ad hoc deal here or there, but without any hope that such fleeting bargains will add up to a reliable relationship. Putin will not work for America, and neither will Xi.
