Preventing Operational Atrophy In The Long War

Saturday, December 10, 2016
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Bad or nonexistent national strategy manifests itself in suboptimal military responses.   The 2011 withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Iraq is a classic example.  It threw away success garnered by the 2007 “surge” on the premise that Iraqi forces, aided by airstrikes and special operators, could stabilize the post-hostilities phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Counterinsurgency operations must address their center of gravity: a secure living environment.  General purpose ground formations have historically been essential to achieving that end. Military forces should never be applied absent clear strategy; when they are, all the tools in the operational commander’s kit must be on the table.

Preventing Operational Atrophy in the Long War by Hoover Institution on Scribd

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