The Strength of Alliances: Australia’s Crucial Role in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

>> H.R. McMaster: America and other free and open societies face crucial challenges and opportunities abroad that affect security and prosperity at home. This is a series of conversations with guests who bring deep understanding of today's battlegrounds and creative ideas about how to compete, overcome challenges, capitalize on opportunities, and secure a better Future.

 

I am H.R. McMaster. This is Battlegrounds.

>> Speaker 2: On today's episode of Battlegrounds. Our focus is on Australia, a key ally of the United States in the Indo Pacific region. Our guest is Justin Bassi, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. From 2015 to 2018, Bassi served as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, where he was responsible for security policy and operations, including counterterrorism, foreign interference, and cyberspace.

 

He then served as the Cyber Intelligence Mission Manager at the Office of National Intelligence and later as Chief of Staff to the Minister of Foreign affairs and Minister for Women Senator the Honorable Maurice Payne. Prior to this role, Basse served as National Security Advisor to the Attorney General.

 

He spent over a decade in the Australian public service, including in the intelligence community and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Australia is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance and party to the 1951 ANZUS security treaty. Australia's economy is deeply intertwined with the People's Republic of China.

 

In recent years, Australia has experienced growing tensions with Beijing. In 2018, Australia decided to ban Chinese company Huawei from its 5G networks. When Canberra called for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID 19 in 2020, Beijing responded with a campaign of economic aggression. Australia has been a staunch ally of the United States since 1940.

 

The Australian military has fought alongside the US military in every major conflict since World War I. Against the backdrop of Chinese aggression in the Indo Pacific, Australia has increased defense spending while expanding security agreements and cooperation with the United States, Canada and Pacific nations. In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced Aukus, a trilateral security partnership focused on deepening defense and technology collaboration.

 

This alliance aims to support the Royal Australian Navy in acquiring nuclear powered submarines and enhancing cyber AI, quantum computing and undersea capabilities between the three countries. In May 2025, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese won a landslide victory and became the first leader to win re election in two decades.

 

He announced the priorities for his new term as growing the Australian economy, combating climate change, strengthening Medicare, cutting taxes and student debt, and securing Australia's place in the world. Albanese stressed that the Australia US alliance remains a very important constructive relationship grounded in deep economic ties and a defense partnership, stating that the United States is an important nation for us and indeed for the world.

 

After President Trump's inauguration in 2025, Washington has been a less predictable partner for Canberra. In June, the Trump administration launched a formal review of the Aukus agreement to ensure it alliance with Trump's America first agenda and U.S. industrial capacity. The review spurred bipartisan congressional letters in support of the agreement.

 

Despite a U.S. trade surplus with Australia of $17.9 billion, President Trump imposed a 10% tariff on Australian exports in addition to a 50% tariff on its steel and aluminum. In 2024, U.S. goods trade with Australia totaled $51.3 billion, with the U.S. exporting $34.6 billion and importing $16.7 billion.

 

We welcome Justin Bassi to discuss threats to international security, Australia's role in the Indo-Pacific, and opportunities for Canberra and Washington to work together to promote peace and prosperity.

>> H.R. McMaster: Justin Bassi, welcome to Battlegrounds. I can't think of anybody better to help us understand better the world the challenges we're facing from an Australian perspective than you, having served for five Prime Ministers.

 

And of course, I have really fond memories of our time serving together when I was National Security Advisor and you were National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. So, welcome to Battlegrounds. Great to see you again.

>> Justin Bassi: Fabulous to be here with you. Thanks for the opportunity.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: So, first, I'd like to ask you from the perspective down under on overall threats to security. I mean, you've been doing this for your whole career, trying to understand the world and what the challenges are to security and prosperity. How do you see threats across the world today?

 

From an Indo Pacific associated with the aggression of the Chinese Communist Party, but, but really, just broadly, what do you think are should be our top priorities?

>> Justin Bassi: H.R. I think, to put it succinctly, the world is on fire and we've got to actually start acting like it.

 

I think my concern is that we are trying to live in an outdated or bygone era where if we just are patient enough, all the threats will just pass us by. I think for the first time in my career, we're looking at multiple crises, multiple threats simultaneously. I think it's not, not to say that they weren't previous dangerous times.

 

Of course, there always have been. But if you look at the Cold War, we knew what we were dealing with as a singular threat coming out of the Soviet Union. In the era of terrorism, we knew what we were dealing with, we could focus on it. And I think countries like Australia have shown that we're very, very good when we have a clear, singular threat.

 

To counter. I think the last few years though, we have of course still got the threat from terrorism, but we've got new threats from everything happening in cyberspace. We've got state on state conflicts, we've got wars around the world in Europe and Middle East. And in terms of the pacing threat and the largest threat to Australia and this region, it is China's military and technological rise.

 

All of this is happening at the same time and therefore we have to be mature enough to address them all at the same time. And that means that we have to recognize that we need to work with our friends and our partners as much as we possibly can.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: Well, Justin, I'd like to talk with you more about what's going on from a around the world perspective and coalescing what you might call an axis of aggressors. But let's begin with China because obviously that is Australia's top concern. And I'm thinking about the Garneau Report that exposed the pernicious influence of the Chinese Communist Party within Australia.

 

And I think what we see now is a higher degree of clarity about various strategies that China is employing to create kind of exclusionary areas of primacy across the Indo Pacific and to rewrite the rules of international discourse in its favor. I'm thinking of the Global Development Initiative and Belt Road and the Global Security Initiative and maybe scariest of all, the Global Civilization Initiative.

 

Could you describe for our viewers how you see the actions of the party and then maybe also talk about what's drawing. Driving Chinese Communist Party's leaders. What is their ambition?

>> Justin Bassi: Yeah, well, starting with the last one first, as succinctly as I can, and I do tend to be verbose.

 

H.R., but their ambition is to supplant you guys, to supplant the US as the primary superior global force, both militarily and technologically, not just economically. And unfortunately, too many other countries are simply allowing that to happen. You mentioned the, the Garneau Report. John Garnaut was asked by Prime Minister Turnbull to do a report in late 2016 after seeing some concerns around Beijing's malign activity.

 

And that was absolutely vital. From the Australian context, I can give you just a slight bit of history of how we. Why did it take to 2016? Why did we suddenly have people like the Prime Minister and people like John Garno and others. People in my position as the Prime Minister's National Security Advisor focused on this, particularly in the context HR as you recall, in 2016, the number one issue for people around the world, the countries around the world, number one security issue from an Australian perspective was the rise of ISIS.

 

ISIS still in 2016 had land in Syria and Iraq was still looking to develop our operations, not just impacting the Middle east or the US but countries like Australia. So what caused us in amongst all of that? When the public wasn't crying out and saying we need to address the threat from China, why did we sudden to do it?

 

The, the issue for Australia is that we've gone on, on some waves in, in 2009. H.R. very quickly there was a, a public release of a defense white paper, a very, very good white paper that if you read now and you scratched out the fact that it said 2009, you say, yeah, this seems pretty, pretty relevant.

 

It refers to China's military rise as a threat. Australia needs submarines and other capabilities and a massive defence increase, defense investment increase to counter it. The issue was that it came at the same time as a global financial crisis. And the decision that the Australian system took as a whole was to prioritize the economy over the security issues, thinking that we needed to ensure that we could get through the economic downturn.

 

And for Australia, the money coming out of China did really have a significant impact for us to be able to survive that global financial crisis. But it g. The completely wrong idea. It said to China from 2009 to 2015 that Australia, like so many other countries, would tolerate security threats and security intrusions if China's money was coming through.

 

And so that by the time 2015 came around and by the time people, by the time Prime Minister Turnbull became Prime Minister, people like John Garno and I came together in his office, there was a confluence of events. HR that meant that the military rise was continuing. Unilaterally, they were militarizing the South China Sea.

 

Cyber attacks were increasing foreign interference. We didn't know that. We didn't have the phrase foreign interference in our lexicon in 2015, 2016. H.R. we didn't use it, we used traditional espionage. Why the John Garno's report was so important was it actually updated our security system to say that we've got to get out of the traditional threats of pure state on state conflict, as in after the bullets have started firing or terrorism.

 

We have to recognize that hybrid threats are an issue, and so we looked at these issues and realized that we needed to almost reinvent our policy making. And so instead of trying to balance the impossible balance of economics and security in which inevitably politicians, the business sector, the academic sector will always argue that the economics needs to be, take priority over short term security.

 

The issue that came for us was sovereignty. Is this decision going to impact our sovereignty? Is it going to strengthen it and protect it? Or is it going to give a foreign power a vote or a veto over our national security decisions? That was a key element that came about in that period.

 

And so coming towards where we are now 10 years on after that period began in 2015, my concern, HR is that while we protected ourselves in multiple ways that we can go through, including introducing foreign interference laws, excluding Chinese companies like Huawei from the 5G system and things like that, we are now in a period of economic downturn again.

 

And the signs unfortunately are that Australia and several other countries are once again saying what we really need to do is prioritize the economy and we need to be able to tolerate the security threats in a way that should HR be intolerable. And that's, that's my concern as to where we currently are.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: Yeah, I, I share the concern. And you've seen the United States some recent developments too with selling H20 chips to China, I think again because of economic pressure and economic rationale. And of course, you know, China is, is happy to, to, to entice our firms and, and our leaders with, you know, the false promises of access to their market.

 

I mean how would he, you know, just that whole cycle, right of, of co option coercion, concealment, you know, it's just. How many times do we fall for it. I mean, what do you, what do you say to, to, to people who make the argument, hey, we have to prioritize the economy.

 

What, what, what is your kind of succinct pitch that you give them in connection with preserving our sovereignty?

>> Justin Bassi: Well, I mean, first of all, of course it is clear that a healthy economy and a prosperous economy is vital for us all. So there's no doubt about that.

 

And I'm not saying that we should put ourselves in a position where we've got a weak economy and I'm not saying that we should decouple completely from China. We are intertwined with China in so many ways. All countries are in 2025. The issue is that too often the debate, HR is between just doing nothing other than doubling down on our vulnerabilities to China economically and technologically versus decoupling and both of those are not practicable.

 

The answer is we've got to find a way to be willing to say, well yes, we do need an economic relationship, but we need to do it with due diligence. We need to, we, we've just had timely the when we're doing this podcast, it's just after our Prime Minister, the Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has returned from a six day visit to China.

 

I'm not sure that when he visits the U.S. he's going to have six days to to us. I, I, I wish he, he would. There should be more things to talk about with the US Than there are with China, HR but visits are important. The issue is that what I fear that we saw is what exactly you said, how many times we're going to make the same mistakes.

 

It's deja vu all over again. The visit from the Australian Prime Minister was about how much the economies are in 2020. Twined and how great that is. Economic relationship, yes, it's important. But we had the Prime Minister also take a high level business delegation, a number of high wealth Australians, some of our most wealthy individuals and most wealthy companies.

 

And the risk that we saw was threefold. HR and it wasn't just a risk. It then played out. The first one was that as you know, when you're going to China, you've got to avoid, as a, as a Prime Minister or minister or a trade delegation, you've got to avoid being used for propaganda purposes.

 

And unfortunately we had a situation where the Chinese leaders, both President Xi and Premier Li, spent much of their public time effectively saying, isn't this great? China is the state stable, major power that believes in fair and free trade, meaning the, your, your so called ally, the great America is now unreliable, unstable, doesn't believe in fair trade, fair and free trade.

 

Therefore, you know who the better relationship is, it's Australia and China. And that effectively went unanswered. So it was a propaganda tool. The second risk was that we allow, allow not just good trade relations, but that trade becomes an overdependency. And we've seen that. Hr, as you said time and time again, we don't have to go back to the 1930s, we don't have to go back even to look at other people's mistakes, Europe's mistakes with Russia.

 

Australia has undergone years and years of economic coercion at the hands of Beijing from 2018 to effectively the last few months. And yet we have gone back to say, well, we really want to double down on all these investments and to allow China to have a monopoly which creates further vulnerabilities.

 

And the third element which is related is where we show both China, but also I am concerned that we're showing the Australian public, HR, that short term financial reward that we can get from China is more important than either the immediate security concerns or human rights issues. And very, very quickly we had six days of full expression of the economic relationship and the cultural links.

 

We had panda diplomacy. The Prime Minister went and visited the pandas. But whenever a security discussion or human rights question was raised by the Australian media, it was effectively shut down by a political method that said, yes, we discussed that issue in private. Of course, you and I are both aware that you need to be able to have private discussions with international counterparts.

 

But the Australian public, HR deserves to be told. Not just that, we raise the issue of a detained Australian in this case, Dr. Young Henjun, who's been detained since January of 2019. We shouldn't just be told that that just that issue was raised as though it was a consular case like any other Australian who's detained around the world for alleged crimes.

 

This should have been, not only was it raised, but I told my Australian, my Chinese counterparts that this is a structural issue that is impacting the relationship. And until we have Dr. Young returned, the Australia China relationship will unable to, to be stabilized. And there should be a range of these issues that we tell the Australian public that security and human rights matter.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: Absolutely. I think that, for example, even genocide in Xinjiang should be like an ESG issue. But as you mentioned, I mean, there are practical reasons not to fall into the trap in terms of China's enticing, you know, you, with, with access to their, access to their market or big returns on investments like you saw during this visit.

 

But then of course, once you're in, you know, they use that economic relationship for course of purposes as Australia experienced most recently in the early 2000s when Australian leaders had the temerity to suggest that, well, maybe we should figure out the origins of COVID 19. So what I'd like to ask you is you've mentioned several reasons of competition.

 

The military aggression that we've seen in the South China Sea where China's laying claim to the ocean vis a vis Taiwan. Economic forms of aggression, which include espionage, which include the forced transfer of intellectual property, the massive subsidies and overproduction and dumping to drive our businesses out of business, using control of critical supply chains for coercive purposes.

 

The list goes on. But also informational and propaganda and, and, and you know, united front work department sort of work to diminish our will. What do you think, Justin? What is your prescription for how to compete more effectively with the Chinese Communist Party? You know, to, to counter various forms of aggression and of course, you know, to prevent what we all want to prevent, which would be a cataclysmic war with, with China.

 

 

>> Justin Bassi: Yeah, it's, it's a, it's not just a good question, HR I think it's the question that we need to be focused on right now. And I think going back to your time when, when you and I were dealing with our respective issues as national security advisors, you and, and I think your deputy, Nadia Shadow at the time, put out a, a, a public document in 2017, your national security strategy, I think, and that document for me in my role and for the Australian system, given that we were about a year into our policy shift in relation to China and our security policy changes.

 

That was a really vital document because it focused on competition. I can't remember how many times, I think I counted them at the time that it came out. But it was not just a reference one off to, there's competition. It was the focus that we are in an era of competition.

 

Then of course, everybody since then has focused on, yet we're in strategic competition, an era of strategic competition. But part of the issue is that if that then just becomes a phrase that politicians use, that then waters, waters it down so that we're not, we're using the pros but not doing anything practically, we then leave the field again.

 

HR and so what we can't afford is to say that we, that we know that there's an era of strategic competition, but then not actually compete and leave the playing field for China simply to do what it wants, when it wants. And I do think that we are at risk of effectively allowing China to double down on its competitive advantage.

 

And also secondly, we're at risk of feeding into a false equivalence where we say, you know what the problem with the world at the moment is? It's great power competition. And if only the US and China would both be better, wouldn't the world be a safer place? The answer is no, there is no equivalence between US and China.

 

No matter whether you liked the president of the day or not in the White House, there is no comparison between the democracy of the United States and the authoritarian regime of China. So what do we need to do to compete? We need to first of all be willing to talk about what strategic competition.

 

Means and I think, HR this is where, from an Australian perspective, I'm concerned that something that you and I talked about over the years, that Australia was in many respects leading the way from 2016 on in understanding what China was doing in the military space. Yes. But also in the technological space and leading in areas like 5G.

 

I think that we have now not just gone back to the peloton, but we are now falling behind because we have Europe for many years. I would be saying, well, Europe, you've got to understand not just what you're facing with Russia, but you're facing a bigger threat technologically from China.

 

I think that Europe has actually, yes, in some ways they've been forced into it, whether it be because of Russia's war on Ukraine, whether it's because President Trump has put a lot of pressure on them to do more for their own security. But they now say publicly, HR to their, to their own public, to the global, in global platforms, that China is, yes, an economic partner, but they are a strategic rival.

 

And I think that, that, that recognition that transparency is important. It's important start. Australia is not willing to say that, HR. We say that they're an economic partner and we're not willing to say that, but yes, they're a strategic rival. What would it mean to do that, to be transparent?

 

Well, the public would have a greater understanding of why we might not always be able to get the cheapest goods. We might not. And why we might have to work with partners like the us, like Japan, to rebuild some of our sectors. And as part of that, I'm a big believer in working with the United States, Japan and others, our ORcas partner in UK, our democratic partners in Europe on protecting our critical infrastructure.

 

HR we can talk about this a bit more if you like, but we can't afford to have a situation where not only is China important for us economically, but we are completely dependent on China technologically. There are too many fields, hr where we shouldn't have high risk vendors or suppliers of concern in our critical infrastructure.

 

I mean, if an Australian cares about the environment, for example, and has solar panels on their roofs, in all likelihood they've been made in China and probably they've been made from, with by slave labor through the supply chains linked into Xinjiang. If they're driving an electric vehicle, no matter what company the car is, the car is even the great American companies they're driving with a Chinese battery.

 

We are getting our news from TikTok. We've got to actually look at the world as it is now and say what areas are critical to society. And in those areas that are critical to society, we've got to factor in security and we've got to put in a default HR that says that in those supply chains, energy systems, water supplies, our communications, telecommunications, you cannot be a supplier of concern.

 

That would be a very easy way to deal with that issue. Yes, it would force us as Australians to work with the Japanese, to work with the Americans, to work with the Brits and say, how are we going to provide an alternative for our public? But we can't afford to say, as too many people are saying, hr, you know why we need an economic relationship with China?

 

Because we need money to pay for our defence. And, and because, of course, defense does take up a lot of money. But how ludicrous is that? HR because that actually means, what we're saying to the Australian public is we have to double down on our trade relationship with China to get the money to pay for the defense systems to protect us from China.

 

And that, that, that's akin to Europe saying, you know, why we needed Nord Stream. We know why we need a relationship with Russia, because we need the money to pay for our defense to protect us from Russia. We've got it. We've got to be better than that.

>> H.R. McMaster: Yeah, I think, I think you already alluded to this.

 

You know, the lesson of, of Russia's massive reinvasion of Ukraine in February of 2022 was, hey, it turns out to be a really bad idea to give a hostile power, coercive power over your economy. And the energy dependence of Europe on Russian natural gas is analogous, I think, to our dependence on so many critical supply chains involving various sources of energy like solar panels and batteries and so forth.

 

Maybe this is a good time to talk more broadly about this axis of aggressors. You know, I think that we tend, Justin, to view the China problem as one discrete problem set. And then the Putin and Russia problem is a discrete problem set, in Iran, North Korea. But what we've seen is this kind of coalescing of an axis of aggressors.

 

I'm, I'm thinking in particular of that, of that joint statement that, that Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin issued during the Beijing Olympics on the eve of the, of the massive reinvasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. And, you know, the message to us just was, hey, you're over in the west, you know, we're in charge now.

 

Get used to it. This is the talk of, you Know, the new era of international relations or when Fusion Pink says, Vladimir, Vladimir, you know, we're seeing changes like we haven't seen in a century and the changes are in our favor. So how do you view the axis of aggressors?

 

We see a lot of tangible support for one another. And how do we, how do we compete effectively? There are some people in the United States just who think that the way to compete with China is to play like little kids football, you know, or soccer and run to the Taiwan Strait, you know, and say, well, hey, you know, Ukraine's, you know, Europe's problem, the Middle east is just a mess to be avoided.

 

Let's all focus on, you know, on, on the, on the Taiwan issue, for example, or South China Sea. How do you view the axis overall and what do you think or holistic response might be to this really de facto alliance? I would say.

>> Justin Bassi: Yeah, well, I think we have to be willing to talk about in those terms.

 

HR I, if we, if we, if we, if we were doing this 10 or 15 years ago and 10 or 15 years ago I was in the Australian intel intelligence community, worked for the Office of National Assessments, it'd be fair to say that those assessments, and they would have been no doubt similar to the U.S. intel Communities assessments, that one of the greatest things that separates the US and its alliance network from China and Russia is that they don't have an alliance network or they didn't have an alliance network and there wasn't trust amongst thieves.

 

And so that we were able to separate both geographic regions and individual adversaries. And the great American alliance network would always keep us on top of, but it's a little bit like, you know, you mentioned that the, the sporting reference of everyone following the ball, the under nine soccer team, that's 100, right.

 

We tend to do that. We also are at risk of being the reigning champions of a professional league thinking that we'll always remain remaining champions if we don't continue to evolve and not recognizing everybody that who we beat is looking to hunt us down and they're going to improve their own skills and their own capabilities.

 

And if we don't continue improving, we'll be caught up. That's where I think we've been with China for too long. I, I, I, I think that. We didn't recognize early enough that sure, China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, they aren't an alliance in the way that the US And Australia are.

 

That does remain true, of course. However, they are aligned. And so not having a formal alliance doesn't mean they're not working together, doesn't mean that they don't see the common objectives. And that as you pointed to in 2022, the fact that they had become so bold, HR China and Russia, Moscow and Beijing, to say we have a no limits partnership, I mean, that's effectively them telling the world we are aligned and we're as close as allies as we're going to be and our objectives are the same.

 

And their objective, yes, Russia is looking to take over Ukraine and we all stand in support of Ukraine as a sovereign country, but the objective of both Moscow and Beijing is, is to harm the United States and is to, to supplant the United States as the global power.

 

And they want all of the, as many of the American allies as possible to move away from the U.S. so this is what we're up against. We do have a situation where these four authoritarian regimes got to the point where they thought that the democratic world simply was weak enough for them to move on.

 

And we've seen this in multiple ways. Obviously something that, you know, you're a strategist in deterrence in a way that too few people are around the world. HR so you know this better than most. But really, when you look at what happened in February of 2022 with Russia invading Ukraine, it didn't start the moment they crossed the border.

 

We had lost deterrence leading into that Europe wasn't spending enough on defense. Why did Hamas attack so viciously and brutally Israel in October of 2023? Well, yes, there were mistakes that Israel made to allow that actual moment to happen. But again, the, the fact that we had Iran and its proxies thinking that they could do as they please and that there wouldn't be an ability to stop them.

 

That's what we need to get back into the mode of that we've got to stop having these conversations are about, well, what would we do in a hot war situation? We've got to say how do we regain deterrence, how do we avoid the horrors of war? But unfortunately we need to prepare for war as well.

 

And, and I do think that this authoritarian access that you referred to, we need HR our political masters and our senior bureaucrats to be willing to say, yes, it exists. Yes, China and Russia are working together. I think an example that I think that we aren't doing well enough here in Australia and I don't think we're doing well enough around the world is to say that Russia's war on Ukraine wouldn't be happening the way it's happening right now without China's support.

 

We have had in previous moments the Secretary General of NATO, for example, say that China is the main enabler of Russia's war. Those comments are really important. We've all got to do that. And I suppose I get disappointed when Australian politicians or American politicians or global politicians and bureaucrats say we, we don't like that North Korean troops are fighting against Ukraine.

 

Of course we don't like the fact that North Korean troops are fighting but they are unwilling to say we don't like China is supporting Russia. And the only reason we're willing to take a firmer stand against North Korea is because we don't rely on them economically or technologically.

 

That's how vulnerable we are. HR to Beijing. Beijing knows that they've got us where we want them because we are unable to speak truth to them and we're unable to tell our public that China is not just part of the authoritarian axis. HR China is the head of the authoritarian axis and we've got to be willing to deal with them.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: Absolutely. And you know, I think the more we can talk about just the tangible ways that, that China's underwriting the war in Ukraine with, you know, purchases of Russian energy, but also, you know, the, the electronics and the hardware and the equipment necessary to continue the onslaught.

 

And you mentioned the North Korean troops. How about the Iranian shahed drones and, and the shahed drone factory, right? And so, so the evidence is, is just really overwhelming about how this axis is working together. And of course, you know, I think we should be confident. Justin, you mentioned the reticence of confronting China, but really, when you look at the aggregate of our economies, the United States, Japan, Australia, Europe, right, and other like minded countries, I think that we should be confident not only in our capacity to cope with the economic challenges but also our militaries.

 

And, of course, there's been some progress in this area of, I think that you mentioned, Aukus, which for our viewers who might not be familiar with it is as the Australia, United Kingdom US alliance that is organized around strengthening defense, but also as you mentioned, the technological competition to maintain our competitive and grow competitive advantages.

 

Of course, I think anytime that we can enter in a close relationship with Australia, it's redounded our benefit. I mean our viewers will know from the intro Australia's gone to every war with it, with, with the US Even Vietnam. It was very controversial for your country. So there's been recently this news and I know it had a big impact in Australia of, of, of defense officials in the United States questioning the, the AUUS alliance and saying we have to really make sure it's in our interest.

 

I can't see how it's not, but how did that play in Australia? And what's Your response to U.S. department of Defense officials who are wondering is this good for US interests?

>> Justin Bassi: Yeah, HR's really interesting. I think it's fair to say that there is a fair bit of anxiety in Australia Australia for basically all of our history from a military perspective we first of all were reliant upon our, our British links.

 

And then of course as we saw the UK shift its focus on the world need to focus more internally and become less dominant. Australia had the great advantage and benefit of seeing the American rise and take over from the UK as the most dominant global power. And many respects people don't, I suppose, recognize how lucky we were that as Britain was having to revise its ability to be a global enforcer of rules.

 

The country that was supplanting the UK was so friendly. I think that we don't look hard enough to see, well, if the US stopped being that global enforcer of rules, who is there coming up behind the US? Unfortunately the pacing challenge to the United States is China and they don't want a democratic rules-based order to be the front runner on.

 

They want a Sinocentric Authoritarian order, which will look a whole lot different for us. I think we need to be conscious of that. I think that that is why Australia has done so much over the years for our own security and to be able to say to the our American allies, we are a true security partner that takes on our burdens and we want to work together to make sure that we are collectively more secure.

 

You mentioned Orcas, we talk about orcas that came about HR for only one reason. I mean, it's quite an interesting short story that when Australia was going through its change in 2016 to recognize that we needed to do more militarily, we were one of the only countries to say yes, we are getting to 2% of GDP spend.

 

In our 2016 defense white paper, we moved to improve our defence capabilities. We made a decision to go with the French partners for our submarine program in 2016, which was a conventional diesel submarine program. In the years after that HR the assessments of China's military and technological rise began to change.

 

So that by the time 2020 came along, the assessment was, well, hang on a minute. We now face a situation where China's military and technological capabilities means that in all likelihood a diesel submarine is not going to be able to give us what we need operationally to either deter or to operate in, in a conflict or crisis period.

 

And that therefore what is needed operationally was nuclear powered submarines. That that assessment is exactly the type of thing we need to do to say that when your adversary's capabilities change, you need to change along with it. And so the beauty of that orcus partnership was it wasn't just Australia, HR saying gee, Australia faces a situation where we need better capabilities.

 

The Americans and Brits came together and said, you know what? We have not shared this technology, this, this the crown jewels of American technology that had, had only been shared between the US and UK always get the year wrong. But in about 1958 or so since then, not shared with anyone.

 

Why do we need to consider sharing with Australia? Not to just help Australia, America's got many great allies, but because we recognized that we needed a collective power to take on what China would confront us with in the years to come. So that Orcus partnership is, yes, it's about primarily nuclear submarines HR, but it's actually more important about the nuclear submarines.

 

And so I suppose that the tension that was going to your question about what the feeling is out here in Australia, which is such an important question, I think in many respects it's less about nuclear submarines and it's about any time there is a question from the American side of do we need orcas?

 

When it presented as do we need orcas? That then hits at the Australian security soul, saying, well, hang on a minute. Are the Americans questioning the relationship with Australia? Because Australia needs the United States, the region needs the United States to ensure that it's crystal clear that they will not allow China to do as it will simply because it is the biggest power out in this region.

 

I think there is a probably an over anxiety but born in our history that says we fear America leaving us. And so I think HR the issue for me, what I think the American administration can do a bit in a better way is messaging not to say that they shouldn't ever question things.

 

I think the American administration and going back to when you and I were counterparts, I think the American administrations can always ask more of Australia. What are you Australia doing from a security perspective? We would like you ideally to do more in these areas of A, B, C and D.

 

So it's not about not asking Australia to do more, but where there is a perception that is, is the US questioning orcus? I think very easily the American administration could come out and say we're not questioning the need for orcus. The reason that ORCUS was formed was because of the threat that China poses.

 

All that threat has not got any better since ORCUS began. It's got worse. And therefore the partnership, the partnership between America and Australia and the UK is now more vital than ever. And we recognize that in administration. But we're allowed to ask questions of whether our submarine industrial base is fit for purpose.

 

We're allowed to ask question of whether our allies, Australia, the uk, Europe, Japan, Korea, are you doing enough? Are there areas that we can seek improvement? Those questions and requests can happen, but I do think we need to make sure that we don't allow ourselves to divide over it or to give the sense to the public that there is perhaps an unreliability between us.

 

I think two things can happen at once. It's like what we said at the beginning. There are multiple crises happening at once. We need to be able to address multiple crises simultaneously here. It's not about giving a misperception to the public that don't worry, there's nothing, there's no problems with our military capabilities and there's no room for improvement.

 

But we can say that at the same time as saying the relationship between Australia and the US the relationship with orcas, these relationships are vital to our own individual national security. So even under an American first policy, HR ORCAs should be the partnership with Australia and the UK should absolutely hit right in the center of an American first security policy.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: Yeah, just, I totally agree. You know, President Trump's priority is often like, responsibility sharing. He often asks these implicit questions, you know, what's in it for us? You know, why do we care? I think that's valid for America first or Australia first perspective. The second thing he asked is why do we have to do it?

 

Why can't somebody else do it? That he asks, how much does it cost, and can others pay more? Right. Well, it's alliances that I think gives you that opportunity to, to really, you know, engage in collective security. And if you had to do it all by yourself, it'd be impossible.

 

Right. So, so I, I, I do, I do hope that, you know, that there's a recognition that, that alliances are the best way, you know, to, to share responsibility and, and, and, and to restore deterrence, to make our supply chains more resilient. As we talked about, to invigorating our defense industrial base, the one aspect we haven't talked about is really diplomatic efforts and the degree to which we should work together to counter China's narrative.

 

And this is where I think the Prime Minister's recent visit to China made out of health. Because what China wants to do is create this image of cow towing, you know, to the, to the Emperor Xi Jinping. And what Xi, of course, when he talks about a, a, what does he call it?

 

A shared future of a common destiny.

>> Justin Bassi: Humankind.

>> H.R. McMaster: All humankind.

>> Justin Bassi: Yes.

>> H.R. McMaster: That's what he need to run for the exits. So, but I, I think it's clear, you know, that, that what he wants is he wants servile relationships. Right, he wants China to, yeah, kind of reinstate the tributary system of the Shing.

 

Dynasty. And so when US and Australian officials, I think when they talk to our friends and your close friends there in, in Southeast Asia, for example, hey, we, the point we have to make is, hey, this is not a choice between Beijing and Washington and as you mentioned, it's not a moral equivalency thing, but it's really a choice between sovereignty and servitude.

 

I mean, I would say Washington and Beijing is, Russia's on the sovereignty side obviously, and Beijing wants servile relationships. How do you think it's going in terms of it being the effort to counter China's, China's really sustained campaign of co option coercion and concealment? How are we in the free world doing?

 

 

>> Justin Bassi: Hr I think we are losing the narrative battle and we're losing it badly. And I, I think it's, it's obviously we need a focus on military and technological capability. Capability is vital. But it narrative, messaging, communications, it's two sides of the same coin, we need both capabilities and narrative.

 

This region is really interesting. HR you mentioned Southeast Asia in particular. Many politicians in this region talk about ASEAN centrality, that, you know, putting Southeast Asia at the center of foreign policy of the region. And in many respects that is absolutely right. And there's a reason why China of course is focused on trying to win the hearts and minds of Southeast Asia.

 

Lots of developing economies, big economies like Indonesia, it is a very important region. China though, is succeeding in convincing this region, particularly Southeast Asia, but also heading to into the Pacific itself, that even if you don't like China and China's actions, major powers are all the same. If you don't like us, don't like the United States.

 

And by the way, the United States is far away. You can't trust them to always come here. Look at their America first policy. They're going to turn inwards. Whether you like us or not, China is right here where your neighbors so deal with us as a starting point and then they get on a roll of their narrative.

 

We talked about Orcas, hr, China, we've effectively allowed China too much leeway. We've tolerated their ability to go into the region and say orcus is a problem. Southeast Asian nations, you should not like Orcus because it's a nuclear deal. And the crazy part is that we shouldn't be losing these types of narrative Asia because Aukus, yes, it's about nuclear submarines, but it's about nuclear powered submarines that are conventionally armed.

 

China not only has nuclear submarines, but they've got nuclear Armed submarines. So the very country that is proliferating is convincing the region that it is Australia and the US that is the problem. And this, whether it be a false equivalence between the US and China or China's narrative in a whole range of other areas, we've got to focus desperately, desperately focus more on it.

 

We've got to leverage the fact that, as you said, I think you said something like the difference between sovereignty and servitude, that that to me has to be where we look for our narrative and we have to be more willing to say that the US and its alliance and partnership network, the US is about strengthening every country's sovereignty.

 

China is about weakening their sovereignty. And America has friends. China doesn't have friends. They've got clients, they've got trade relationships. The issue is because of that economic vulnerability that we have, hr and people will say, you know, Justin keeps on returning to the economic and technological dependencies, but it's having an impact on our security and our ability to tell the public the truth.

 

HR we are unable to tell everyone what is actually going on because we're fearful of that we're going to face that economic coercion or that diplomatic coercion. So you talk about the political realm. What Australia faced for a number of years was a number of our sectors had trade measures against them for asymmetric reasons.

 

We banned Huawei from our 5G network for security reasons. We introduced our own foreign interference laws. Yes, you're right. We called for shock horror, wanted to understand the genesis of COVID 19. That resulted in a number of our sectors being blocked from the Chinese market, but it also resulted in them blocking any communication between ministers.

 

So effectively it was China saying to the Australian political community, politicians, we will reward you with a phone call or we will reward you with a meeting if you are nice to us. The issue is that it ends up being countries like Australia compromise our own values and principles simply to seek a meeting or simply to get money.

 

And if meetings and money are more important to you than security and sovereignty, we've got a problem. The, that that narrative element really does need to be our, our focus because we're, we're losing, we're losing badly. Do we help ourselves at times? I, I, I do think hr, you know, one of the Trump administration's problems they have from a narrative perspective is they, they are falling in.

 

Well, they are allowing China to say I told you so. So, you know, the tariff, the global tariffs is an example of where there was no real separation, at least in narrative on tariffs. Everybody got a tariff. Australia didn't get as many, only got 10%. So we were lively.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: US has a trade surplus with us.

>> Justin Bassi: That's right.

>> H.R. McMaster: Which plays in your favor. Right. Yeah.

>> Justin Bassi: That's right, and it should. So we've got a trade service. We still got hit. And that feeds into China's narrative in the region that says, america doesn't care about you.

 

And so those things do hurt us. They hurt the US Relationship, but then they also hurt Australia, because Australia is wanting to say to the region, we need to balance what China is doing here. And to do that, we need the American partnership network here. I think the Australian Prime Minister's trip to China did go to this issue of how we are losing the narrative because we are unable to talk truth to power here.

 

But, HR, we have a situation where we're able to be more honest with you guys. And of course, everyone will say, well, you can be more honest with your family than you are with your colleagues, and to a certain extent, that's right. But when you're dealing with major powers, you're dealing with authoritarian regimes.

 

It's not really like dealing with your family. But if we have a situation, HR, where Australia can say the truth to, we can be honest to our American allies and say, we don't like that you put tariffs on us, and the response to that was the Australian problem.

 

Prime Minister and Ministers saying, well, that's an unfriendly act and that's a big deal to say to our American allies that that's an unfriendly act. But that is, that is what it was that, you know, the imposition of tariffs. So we don't like that. But then when we are circumnavigated, HR we were circumnavigated earlier this year by the Chinese PLA Navy and there were live fire exercises in the Tasman Sea.

 

You know, that great, that, that, that, that great sea of contest that, you know, that Australia, New Zealand must be in a contest like it, like the contest that we see in the South China Sea. Of course we aren't, but it shows that there's no equivalence to needing to do the same type of freedom navigation through the Tasman Seas we need to do through the South China Sea.

 

But the response from the Australian political class to being circumnavigated and that was showing China's capability. But why, it's why I raised in the narrative context is because the response was for the Prime Minister and the government to say, well, that didn't breach any international rules. Well, that's fine, it didn't breach international rules, but you still should then say, but it was still an unfriendly act.

 

It was still an act of aggression. It was clearly meant to intimidate all of these. It's not an act that was done in concert with us and they didn't tell us that they were going to do it. So all of these things. But then the Australian public hears, I've just heard from the government that, that, that circumnavigation was, was all okay, that, that we then lose that narrative.

 

And it basically means that China, HR can do it next year and they can do it again and they can do it again and they can do it again. So I, I do think that we need to be really conscious that narrative plays an important part also in terms of making us more nationally resilient.

 

H.R. because if we're not telling the truth to our public of what the threats are, then what happens if there is something, what happens if there is a miscalculation or misunderstanding or there is something that happens over Taiwan or in the South China Sea in relation to the Philippines or a cyber attack, then we have to say we're all suddenly surprised when we really shouldn't have been.

 

And as you know, the less that you can surprise your public doesn't mean that you have to guarantee that they'll never face a security concern. But if they can face it with an understanding that the government and the system is across it, then they are stronger for it and they are more resilient to it.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: Hey, Justin, I'd like to ask you just, you know, one final question here, actually one, one at the end here, too. But, but really go take us back into Australia. So how are, how are the debates playing out now in terms of, you know, what to do about, about the aggression of the Chinese Communist Party, but also the how Australians are regarding the Trump administration, Trump administration's policies?

 

Can you see a bridge from, you know, from these debates to a recognition that it really is, you know, there is not an equivalence here and we can establish a positive agenda. One of the things that I've regretted about sort of the way that tariffs were rolled out and so forth is that it just, it creates a negative sort of dialogue when, when there is so much room for a positive agenda to advance our mutual interests.

 

 

>> Justin Bassi: Yeah, well, can only say that's exactly, is exactly right. I think there is a, there is a risk. H.R. Let me start with this. I, as many people are empathetic to the American administration's view that they've had to carry an unfair proportion of the global security burden when too many of America's allies and partners have not invested in their own security.

 

I'm very empathetic to that. I think what we need to be clear about is that it hasn't suddenly come about in Trump's second term that all of a sudden the US Is concerned about that. As you know, it wasn't even Trump's first term that America shifted on, that multiple presidents have been concerned with allies not quite doing enough.

 

You can go back to, there's some great quotes by President Kennedy in the early 60s, concerned about Europe not doing enough in the Cold War and leaving too much to the U.S. and of course, we know that President Obama was worried about NATO's lack of spending. So this is a genuine concern.

 

And it is why I think Australians can be proud. HR that we have not been in that category of simply saying, well, we can not have to worry because America will save us. And no matter what we do, we have been right there to say we're not as big as you, America, and you are the dominant ally.

 

But as you said, we have been there in every single war. The only country, Australia is the only country to have fought in every single conflict in the last hundred years with the US we were the first country to shift our policy in relation to China when we knew it was going to put our, some of our economic interests in harm's way.

 

And that's what a true national security strategy and an alliance is able to do, to be able to say, right, we are working together for our own individual security, yes, but collectively we are stronger. I think that empathy that I have is there. I think most people recognize it.

 

Most people recognise that Europe didn't do enough against Russia. But I think, interestingly, Australia has struggled. HR with the Trump second term, probably because we were a bit complacent that we did so well during Trump's first term. Maybe it's because you were there in the first term and you're not there in the second term.

 

HR but I think if you have a look at the countries that really, I think, didn't just manage Trump's first term, but really strengthened their own individual relationships. Well, I put the Quad countries as the ones who did best. Remembering, of course, that as much as some people claim Trump and his team are more isolationist.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: It was viewers, that's Japan, India and Australia, along with the us.

>> Justin Bassi: Yes. And it was that that relationship had been effectively killed off in 2007 because of fear that it would upset China. I mean, this is how go back to your. The start aa where you say we keep on making the same mistakes.

 

The court existed, it stopped in 2007 because Australia and others in the Quad were worried about China's reactions to was dead for 10 years. In 2017, during Trump's first administration, under Mike Pompeo's leadership as Secretary of State, the Quad was revitalized and by 2019, there was the first foreign ministers meeting.

 

India, Japan, Australia were strengthening their relationships even as America was changing during that period. I think it's interesting, I think perhaps those three countries, the Quad countries perhaps, thought, well, this is going to be more of the same Trump second term. We're a bit more sanguine about it than our European partners, who went through some anxiety in the first term.

 

I think. Perhaps we're looking at right now in the first six months. HR after some tensions, I think Europe is managing its relationship with the United States slightly better than the quad countries, who all have a few tensions with the US And I think we've got to actually be really quick to say that our current strategy with the US Administration isn't quite working.

 

I do think that the quad countries have tried to play a little bit of a small target. Australia, Australia has played a bit of a small target. We haven't had a meeting yet between the Prime Minister of Australia and the US President. He's the Australian Prime Minister has multiple meetings with President Xi of China.

 

I think we need to recognize that actually while there are some risks, of course, and we might be asked what have you done for us lately? I think that the multiple European leaders, I think the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutter showed exactly what proactive engagement can can the benefits that can come from that.

 

And I think Australia should learn from that. I think what we're seeing. HR and this is the real danger that, that I, I think the Americans and Australians need to get together on is that we can't be, surely can't be saying that because China is, is willing to give us more trade and more tourism that they are slightly easy to deal with at the moment.

 

Therefore, let's go all in on China and we're scared of the US and we're going to hide from them. I mean, HR That's a terrible, I mean that, that's, that situation scares me and that right now we are in a bit of that situation. I think both countries can do something about.

 

I do think the Australian foreign policy system in this respect needs a revision. But it's not all Australia's fault. The US Needs to do better at separating friend from foe. I think in recent times we are seeing more of that after the, the sort of the, the, the big bang moments of the first hundred days of the Trump administration.

 

But there is a level, as I said, a level of anxiety. Orcus is one where there is for your American viewers, the Pentagon is doing a review into Orcus. Now that's absolutely fine. The Brits, when they, when the UK changed their government last year, they did a review into Aukus by someone you know well, the Stephen Lovegrove, and that's fine.

 

All governments, all new governments should be reviewing these things. But we can do the reviews while still saying the relationship is absolutely vital for our respective national and international security. The other element that's going on in Australia. HR Between Australia, us, China is a debate over Taiwan in the last week and I think it shows again the challenge we face with that intersection of capability and narrative.

 

We are, we, we basically haven't had a conversation in Australia about Tai, about Taiwan, about China's express public ambition to unify with force if necessary. And so in the last week there were reports that the American administration had asked Australia would we definitely be in if there was a hot war.

 

Now, of course, no country can say, well, I don't in some future hypothetical war situation, I'm, I'm definitely in. Even, of course, the United States has a policy in relation to Taiwan of strategic ambiguity. But to allow that, why have we got ourselves all anxious and now there's commentary in the media and the political class of why is America asking Australia whether we're definitely in for some type of future unknown war?

 

I don't think America has asked us are we definitely in no matter what? But if America is asking us are we aligned, you know, we're seeing issues happening in the region. You are getting closer once again to China economically. You are talking about trust in the relationship, you're talking about friendship in the relationship.

 

You're talking about respect in the relationship. And of course, HR there's no trust in the Australia China relationship. There's no respect in the Australia China relationship. There's no friendship in the Australia China political or strategic relationship. It is America's absolute right to say, okay, let's take stock. Are we trying, are you doing a two track approach here?

 

Are you trying to leverage some type of political rhetoric here? But are you still aligned that, that we are working together, not the day after some future war begins, but are we working together now to deter that war? What are we doing, Australia and America, to ensure that?

 

We are increasingly continuing to say to President Xi, not today, and I think that America deserves all of its allies to say we, we believe, we continue to believe in, in the international rules that have served us well since the end of World War II and that America has led on and that we do remain yes, all in.

 

And we do not agree with China's actions in the South China Sea. We do not agree with China's actions over Taiwan. Those things should be all agreed and in my view, those conversations should happen. The fact that we don't have them and that we tend to only start having the conversation in some crisis mode shows the very problem that is there.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: Well, Justin, you've laid out what I think should be a positive agenda in so many different ways, right? Strengthening defense, ensuring deterrence, Invigorating our industrial base and our supply chains. Countering China's economic aggression in that connection, energy, security, and diplomatic efforts, right, to clarify our intentions and to make clear this is a choice between sovereignty and servitude.

 

But what a fantastic conversation. The last thing I'd like to ask you, hey, Rugby World Cup's coming up. I think the Wallabies are looking stronger. Good match against the lions. Not the outcome that you wanted, but how about talking to our viewers about how you see Australian rugby and and World Cup 2027 shape it up.

 

 

>> Justin Bassi: Well anytime the rugby World cup is in Australia and New Zealand is it's great for us because of time zones. HR Never never pleasant to have to be waking up in the middle of the night when it's in the the other hemisphere. Australia is a sports mad sports loving country as I know the US is but you unusually I think for for some Americans have a real love affair of, of rugby which is fabulous.

 

I grew up in Sydney and so the, the, the football sports that, that I grew up with were both rugby union and rugby league. I love all of the sports. I'm a massive Aussie rules fan as well. For anyone listening one of our other forms of sports so we are only 25, 26 million people.

 

We played just about every sport under the sun. I would say. HR The I think rugby could do a better job of getting more people in the US and elsewhere if, if we just looked at the rules a little bit. Talking about international rules for the, for the, for the pod.

 

I think there are too many penalties. I'd like to To see the lead up to the 2027 World cup, which can be a showcase of rugby union out here. I think if we can ensure that there's free flowing, as you know, it's, it's, it's called the running game, but so often it's the stalled game.

 

I reckon that we can do a better job of as, just as we've talked about needing to change as the world changes, I reckon we can look at how to make rugby back into the running game that, that it has been over the years throughout. Fewer penalties or finding ways for fewer stoppages.

 

And I reckon that could get more, even, even more great Americans like, like you. I don't know if you agree.

>> H.R. McMaster: Yeah, I do, I do. The penalties are, are galling. But you know, of course compared to American football, it is still the running game, you know, in terms of, in terms of its, you know, the fluidity of it and everything else.

 

But, but hey, I, I'll tell you, I think the teamwork that's, that is rugby, you know, the, the fact that you can, you know, you can go at each other for, for 80 minutes and then, and then have a pint together and get over it. You know, I think society could, could learn a lot from it as well.

 

But.

>> Justin Bassi: Yeah, I love that. And, and I think it, it that describes the Alliance, HR that we should be in a position to be able to have some scraps every now and again and, and say where we might disagree with each other but in a way that recognizes that we're having that disagreement to actually strengthen our security situation.

 

And I do think, you know, to end positively because a bit of what I said may have been they've come across as half glass empty. And I think there are some negative trends there HR and I think China's rise, they continue to rise militarily and technology technologically. But the green shoot, the positivity is as you said, if we can work together, even where we have some disagreements, if we continue to work together, it is our partnership and alliance network that keeps us stronger and we can look after our individual nations as the first priority and we can strengthen that by working together.

 

And that's why the alliance, in amongst all the current issues that we have at the moment, a few little tensions. The alliance continues to be the most important security foundation for Australia and in my view really important from the American situation as well. So I am absolutely glass, not just half full but overflowing in terms of why the alliance is so vital for us.

 

 

>> H.R. McMaster: That's a great way to end it. Justin Bassi, on behalf of the Hoover Institution, thank you for helping us learn more about Battlegrounds, important to building a future of peace and prosperity for generations to come. So good to be with you. Thanks for joining us.

>> Justin Bassi: It's my absolute pleasure.

 

HR Anytime.

>> Speaker 2: Battlegrounds is a production of the Hoover Institution, where we generate and promote ideas advancing freedom. For more information about our work, to hear more of our podcasts, or view our video content, please visit hoover.org.