Israel’s process of learning from its doctrinal and intelligence debacle preceding and during October 7, 2023, has begun in initial, preliminary steps. Beyond questions of policy, it is also likely that the structures of Israel’s decision-making, defense, and strategic intelligence processes will be examined. In this policy brief we provide some historical insight on Israel’s past attempts to revise the structure of its formal strategic assessment mechanisms.
Key Takeaways
- Israel’s warning debacle around the events of October 7, 2023, was a product of flawed conceptions held across the board among elected and unelected officials alike; these conceptions were long held, guiding some of Israel’s policies for more than a decade.
- With strategic surprise being a recurring phenomenon, it is a necessity to optimize the tools being used to prevent it. A thorough review of existing mechanisms in Israel, as well as willingness to consider a significant reform, is needed after the ongoing war is over.
- In contrast to the shortcomings of strategic assessments and warning, Israel’s existing institutions have been highly successful in delivering astonishing operational achievements since late 2023; critics should not ignore the successes obtained by the present mechanisms.
- Historically, assessment errors have led to repeated reviews of Israel’s defense community structure; while some of the recommendations have been partially adopted, previous proposed remedies have not propelled far-reaching reforms.
- The main causes for this past inertia are institutional resistance to structural changes and lack of resolve on the side of senior Israeli politicians to alter existing practices and structures.
Who Should Provide Strategic Warning to Israel? Some Lessons from Its History by Hoover Institution
Cite This Essay:
Jonathan Roll, “Who Should Provide Strategic Warning to Israel? Some Lessons from Its History,” Hoover Institution, Hoover History Lab, June 2025.
