Prominent German politicians distanced themselves sharply from the American and Israeli wars against Iran, leading to a souring of American views of transatlantic relations. Is NATO a casualty of the war?
A leading voice in German foreign policy discussions, Roderich Kiesewetter is a member of the Bundestag where he participates in the Foreign Affairs Committee. A former general staff officer of the Bundeswehr, he is a member of the Christian Democratic Union.
RB: When I review the German press, it seems that many commentators agree with Chancellor Merz that the war with Iran is not Germany’s war—"not our war." Why do you consider this judgment to be mistaken?
RK: The assertion that this is "not our war" is strategically shortsighted and extremely dangerous. Our citizens feel the immediate impact of this every day at the gas pump through rising energy prices. Our economy, too, relies on many critical raw materials that are transported via the Straits of Hormuz. Yet, even more decisively: Germany is an export nation. If we want to preserve our prosperity, then—alongside domestic reforms—we need the unwavering resolve to assert our interests abroad. This includes the freedom of the seas, which must be non-negotiable for us. The Iranian regime is enforcing a blockade in violation of international law and is threatening international trade routes. Anyone who ducks for cover in this situation is abandoning our economic and security-related lifeline.
RB: German criticism and the American reactions to it point to a deep rift. German Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has suggested that–in the wake of the Ukraine and Iran wars–Germany should align itself with neither Russia nor America but should rather occupy a position somewhere in between. How do you assess this geopolitical vision?
RK: Such a scenario would be disastrous for us. If Germany attempts to position itself as a neutral middle power situated between the major blocs, we will inevitably be crushed in the process. This would—fatally—correspond to Halford Mackinder’s “Heartland Theory.” Germany is not strong enough, and Europe is not united enough, to stand alone within the global order. The transatlantic partnership constitutes our vital national interest. However, should the USA—under President Trump—unilaterally abandon this partnership, or continue to dilute its significance, we must be prepared for that eventuality. This means that we must invest massively in our own strength in order to become a partner to the USA on truly equal footing—one that cannot simply be cast aside. In parallel, we urgently need to expand new, values-based partnerships worldwide—for instance, in the Indo-Pacific region with Australia or the Philippines. The concept of the transatlantic partnership is, above all, fundamentally about the liberal societal model. We must ourselves give substance to the notion of the so-called "West" through our own strength and, above all, through consistency. Crucially, there must be no equidistant stance toward Russia. Russia views itself as being at war with the West. A Federal President, too, must be willing to acknowledge this reality.
RB: How do you respond to the assertion that American and Israeli actions violate international law?
RK: A regime that elevates terrorism to the level of state doctrine, seeks to destroy Israel, and—through its proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis—is effectively waging a permanent war against the civilized world cannot hide behind the very legal norms that it tramples underfoot on a daily basis. Consequently, the military response by the U.S. and Israel should not be viewed as an act of aggression, but rather as an act of necessary, extended self-defense aimed at restoring deterrence and security.
RB: The Iranian attack on Diego Garcia demonstrated a range of 4,000 km. This places Berlin within striking distance of Iran. Has Germany successfully brought this threat under control?
RK: No—far from it. The full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 alone should have triggered a radical and immediate shift in thinking. While we have finally initiated the procurement of the Israeli Arrow 3 system—a capability designed to counter precisely these kinds of exo-atmospheric ballistic threats emanating from Iran—the quantity remains far too low, and the acquisition processes are taking far too long. The core problem is this: the security-policy mindset held by many decision-makers in Germany has still not fully internalized the gravity of the current acute threat landscape. As a result, we have failed to initiate the necessary buildup—neither in terms of capabilities nor in terms of personnel.
RB: Please explain the "Change through Trade" (Wandel durch Handel) strategy and why you view it critically.
RK: This strategy is rooted in Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik and aimed at fostering political rapprochement and liberalization within authoritarian states through economic integration. The fundamental problem, however, is that German policymakers failed to adapt this strategy even after it had long since become patently obvious that it had failed. People simply refused to acknowledge that states like Russia or China have no desire to integrate into the international, rules-based world order; rather, they pursue the goal of destroying it from within and replacing it with the law of the strong. These actors then turned economic dependence into a geopolitical weapon against us. I am thinking here, for instance, of China’s Dual Circulation Strategy or Nord Stream 1 and 2.
RB: Perceptions of threat vary across Europe (e.g., the Baltics versus Spain). How can these differences be managed?
RK: First and foremost, we must acknowledge and understand these geographical disparities as a reality. It stands to reason that in Spain or Italy, the focus lies on the instability in North Africa and on migration flows, whereas Scandinavia feels the threat of Russian imperialism right on its doorstep. The solution lies in an intelligent, European-wide division of burdens. I recently outlined this by using the example of Denmark and Greenland: As an Arctic littoral state, Denmark must be able to concentrate on containing Russian and Chinese ambitions in the High North. In return, Germany—as an economic heavyweight—must shoulder the burdens on the eastern flank and provide massive military support to Ukraine. Only through such a functional division of responsibilities can we, as a continent, become truly capable of self-defense.
RB: How do you view Germany’s role in the conflicts in Ukraine and with Iran?
RK: In our conventional political speeches, we like to talk about wanting to assume a leadership role—yet in reality, I often fail to see this in action. Anyone who trots out clichés such as "this is not our war" is effectively shirking their duties. Germany urgently needs to step up and fulfill its pivotal role in transforming Europe into an independent strategic actor capable of asserting its own interests. The objectives in both conflicts are crystal clear: Ukraine must win this war, and Russia must recognize the right to exist of its neighbors and abandon its imperialist ambitions. In the Middle East, a change of regime in Iran lies in our own vital interest. The Mullah regime is the root of all evil in the region; it seeks to destroy Israel and obstruct our maritime trade routes. It is our duty to call this out and to act accordingly.
RB: How do you assess China’s role in this context?
RK: China is not a neutral observer; rather, it is actively pursuing the dismantling of the liberal world order. Beijing is a key and dominant member of the "CRINK" alliance (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea). Unfortunately, many in Germany still fail to recognize this and, instead, continue to make themselves dependent on China in critical sectors. This is geopolitically extremely unwise—particularly when we observe how Beijing is preparing for the violent annexation of Taiwan. We must be honest with ourselves here: The German economy as a whole is not nearly as massively dependent on China as is often claimed. Rather, it is specific major sectors and DAX-listed corporations that have allowed themselves to slide into this perilous dependency. The broad base of small and medium-sized enterprises is far more resilient.
RB: Is Germany prepared for a Russian attack?
RK: No, currently we are not. We can only achieve genuine deterrence and defensive capability if—following a Ukrainian victory—we firmly integrate Ukraine into the European security architecture and NATO. At present, there are only four armies worldwide with real, contemporary experience in conducting large-scale, high-intensity land warfare: those of Ukraine, Israel, Russia, and the USA. Given that the USA is shifting its strategic focus and Israel is currently embroiled in an existential multi-front war, Ukraine represents our most natural and vital partner in the effort to push back against an aggressive Russia in Europe. For us, learning from Ukraine means cultivating both societal and military resilience and vigilance.
RB: What steps should Germany and Europe take to strengthen the transatlantic alliance as the USA reorients its strategic focus?
RK: Accelerating our own buildup of military capabilities is absolutely central to this endeavor. In Europe, we face severe deficits and an almost complete dependence on the USA regarding so-called "strategic enablers": satellite-based reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, long-range precision weapons, strategic air transport, logistics, as well as layered air defense systems and ammunition stockpiles. To save the transatlantic alliance, we must close these gaps and demonstrate to the USA that we are no longer merely consumers of security. However, reducing this dependence requires the genuine, profound implementation of the Zeitenwende [“change of times,” i.e. former Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s claim that Germany is entering a new era in which it will take defense seriously--RB]—in the equipping of the Bundeswehr, in societal resilience, and, above all, in our mindset. Regrettably, I do not yet see this being realized with the necessary depth and rigor.
