- Middle East
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, marked a dramatic shift in the balance of power in the Middle East and affected every dynamic of leadership, opportunities, and threats in the region. The event once again exposed the ability of terrorist organizations to operate as political actors, within democratic systems and to reshape geopolitical reality, demonstrating themselves as agents of chaos.
Leaders who have been replaced since then, and existing leaders who are expected to be replaced, will largely determine the regional balance and shape escalation scenarios and the possibilities for normalization. Future leadership in the region has become even more complex in light of the attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran as of February 28.
Leaders such as al-Sharaa in Syria, who replaced Assad’s rule, represent a model of the strategic success of a terrorist organization transforming into a state entity with international support under the guise of normalization and image change. Similarly, the Ayatollahs and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran, at the beginning of their path, exploited a diplomatic cover, a conciliatory Western approach, and limited sanctions to become a formidable regional power. Erdogan of Turkey and Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority are controversial in light of the anti-Israeli rhetoric they present, yet at the same time they convey conciliatory Western messages that at times blur their true intentions. Both are advanced in age and are expected to be replaced soon.
In contrast, the leaders Abdullah in Jordan and el-Sisi in Egypt are perceived as moderates who maintain the peace agreement with Israel, even if it is frosty and driven by security considerations, and they reflect the encouragement of opportunities and relative stability. Joseph Aoun, who replaced Hezbollah’s leadership within the Lebanese government, is failing to generate internal stability, dismantle Hezbollah of its weapons and power, and ensure regional security: in practice, it is the IDF that is required to do so, with a high likelihood of an imminent war between Israel and Hezbollah. In Israel, this is an election year, after the tenure of the current leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, the longest in the state’s history. It is unclear whether and who will replace him, but these elections will be critical to the Israeli political map against the backdrop of internal social instability and the Swords of Iron war.
Each leader influences each arena individually, yet at the same time the entire regional dynamic, which is heavily influenced by the personalities of the leaders: some are perceived as moderates and reflect the ability to encourage opportunities and end wars, while others generate potential threats that affect global stability.
The leadership and personality of each leader, whether in an existing, changing, or future situation, shape threat scenarios and regional possibilities in the short and long term. Replacing leaders or granting international legitimacy to terrorist organizations under the guise of normalization may dramatically alter the balance, as illustrated by al-Sharaa’s Syria. Proper decision-making requires precise analysis of leaders’ personalities, their power mechanisms, their strategic patience, and their ability to generate simulated normalization.
Since October 7, 2023, the Middle East has been in a new era in which a combination of military power, extreme ideology, and smart policy enables certain leaders to redefine the rules of the game. Understanding their personalities and the way they manage power is essential for policymakers, decision-makers, and intelligence professionals, as it dictates which actors will serve as promoters of opportunities and which will constitute drivers of escalation, and who will ultimately shape the map of threats and opportunities in the region in the coming years.
Leadership in Iran: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (1939-2026)
At the beginning of 2026, another diplomatic crisis developed between the United States and Iran, in which Israel was also involved and threatened by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, with its destruction.
After "Operation Midnight Hammer" in June 2025, which hit Iran's nuclear facilities and ballistic capabilities, Iran, despite American warnings, continued in its production efforts and refused to provide reliable information on hundreds of kilograms of uranium enriched to over 90%, capable of producing approximately 11 atomic bombs.
As part of negotiations between the United States and Iran, the second attempt within a year, Khamenei directly threatened President Trump and the United States and refused to yield to American demands that included removing the nuclear threat, the ballistic program threat, and the spread of terror.
Additionally, widespread popular protests broke out in Iran over the severe economic crisis and the ongoing violations of human rights. The protests were suppressed by Basij forces and the Revolutionary Guards in massacres that caused tens of thousands of deaths. According to testimonies from inside Iran, some protesters were deliberately shot in the eye with live fire, they were restricted in withdrawing cash from banks and their internet and electricity cut off to keep them isolated.
Images taken across Iran documented regime-affiliated armed personnel riding in white Toyota vehicles shooting at protesters. This was the same tactic and even the same type of vehicle used by Hamas’ Nukhba operatives (trained in Iran and Lebanon), who invaded Israel and fired at civilians on October 7, 2023.
Against the backdrop of failed talks and Iran’s strategic delay, on February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a combined and coordinated strike against Iran. On the first day of the war, in a targeted strike, Ali Khamenei, aged 86, was killed. His second son, Mojtaba Khamenei, was injured, but survived the attack.
Ali Khamenei had been known for over four decades as an extreme religious zealot with Shia jihadist views, concentrating all power in his own hands. His rule emphasized religious supremacy and a cruel approach toward his opponents, who were imprisoned and tortured without trial. Iran’s resources and the government he managed were directed toward building military power aimed at the United States, Israel, and the entire West, and hundreds of billions of dollars were allocated to external forces in the form of proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, pro-Iran militias in Syria and Iraq, and Hamas in Gaza (even though it is a Sunni terrorist organization).
This policy created an internal threat within Iran toward its citizens, and an external threat – both regional and global.
The New Leadership in Iran: Mojtaba Khamenei
On March 8, 2026, Mojtaba Khamenei, the second son of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was elected by Iran’s Assembly of Experts as the Supreme Leader , the third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Although the Islamic Revolution does not believe in monarchical rule and opposed it during the days of the Shah, Mojtaba inherited the leadership, most likely by the instruction of his father who had designated him as the next leader. Eighty-eight jurists who are members of the "Assembly of Experts" chose Mojtaba, who had been close since childhood to the Revolutionary Guards who head the government, and although he only completed his religious studies in Qom in 2022 and is not considered to have the highest religious authority. One reason for his selection is the instruction of Ali Khamenei to choose a leader "hated by the West, whom even the Great Satan (the United States) has mentioned." Mojtaba’s cruel personality, even more than his father’s, contributed greatly to the considerations behind his selection. Additionally, the general strategy behind the choice is an attempt to project stability in a hardline conservative regime that continues the ideology of the Islamic Revolution despite the war. This is a signal to the United States of the continuation of Ali Khamenei’s extreme path. Mojtaba’s ability to maintain unity and prevent the disintegration of the Revolutionary Guards stems from his personal connections with many within the organization, including his close ties to the Basij, as he was the architect and commander of the force that suppressed the protests in Iran in 2009. These relationships ensure absolute loyalty to the leader and prevent cracks in the regime that could spread to ignite a new widespread popular uprising – the second critical and most necessary stage in the success of the war.
After his election, his loyalists were required to pledge absolute obedience and loyalty, symbolizing the continuation of his father’s policy.
An interesting point to note is that while Mojtaba grew up with extreme religious values such as uncompromising modesty in dress and a frugal lifestyle – he himself leads a Western hedonistic lifestyle including a secret real estate empire in London, Dubai, and across Europe, alongside international investments worth tens of billions of dollars. This phenomenon includes the children of the ruling elite in Iran who live extravagant lives abroad, despite Western sanctions – openly and with almost no enforcement. While the regime in Iran presents an image of modesty and an Islamic revolution that overthrew the government in 1979 in the name of Islam and the poor, the Iranian people today suffer from severe poverty while the regime’s associates enjoy the citizens’ money from those who suffer and are oppressed.
For many years, Mojtaba was a secretive and shadowy figure who rarely spoke publicly. His participation in the Iran-Iraq war created for him a wide network of connections with senior figures in the regime, and he was officially appointed by his father without a formal process as the supreme authority in decision-making, with approval to bypass the powers of presidents as a direct channel to his father. This authority was practically utilized, and his status strengthened and consolidated alongside his father over decades.
His skills and experience include planning and analytical abilities for repression and control in Iran, managing internal intelligence networks that monitor and examine the loyalty of senior officials. Additionally, he has economic and strategic connections with Russia, a capability that positions him as a global strategist with strong interpersonal skills.
In summary, unlike most Islamic countries in the region, the continuity of leadership in Iran is maintained by Khamenei’s son, altering the Shia Islamic tradition that does not establish dynasties of leadership.
Mojtaba’s selection may challenge the second stage of the war due to his experience and success in suppressing protests and uprisings. It is possible that even his selection as leader was a central consideration because of these abilities he demonstrated in 2009. Only after the Iranian people take their fate into their own hands, take to the streets, and demand new leadership, will the third stage of regime change and the transformation of Iran occur.
Reza Cyrus Ali Pahlavi
Reza Pahlavi, age 65, the exiled crown prince of Iran, son of the last Shah of Iran who was expelled by Khomeini in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, serves as a prominent opposition figure outside Iran in the struggle against the regime in Iran.
Pahlavi has declared that he is not interested in becoming the leader in Iran on "the day after", despite his popular political status among Iranian citizens opposed to the regime. His ability to inspire regime protesters at rallies, alongside his discourse with Western world leaders give him a platform of influence. His Western and secular lifestyle, advocating liberalism, democracy, and openness to change, differs from his father who, on the one hand, maintained excellent ties with the West and with Israel, yet on the other hand acted with cruelty, corruption, and repression toward his people. Pahlavi’s understanding of the geopolitical map and changing reality, alongside the lessons of the past from his father’s actions that the Islamic Revolution exploited, leads him to promote a modern line that places Iran within international discourse.
On "the day after", Pahlavi could lead Iran as a temporary transitional authority until a permanent government is replaced and elected through democratic means. His pro-Western leadership is critical for seizing the governmental vacuum in Iran on "the day after", which may prevent the rise of extremist elements.
Leadership in Syria: Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (al-Julani)
The rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, to the presidency of Syria after the fall of the Assad regime, with direct Turkish assistance, is sometimes presented in the West as a historic turning point: the end of pro-Iranian rule and its replacement with a "pragmatic" Sunni leadership that may balance the Shiite axis. This perception ignores the central fact: al-Sharaa is not an alternative to the Shiite axis, but rather an advanced and sophisticated product of Sunni jihadism, one capable of state and institutional adaptation and of operating under a cover of simulated stability.
Al-Sharaa’s personal and ideological background is deeply rooted in the core of global jihad. He was shaped politically and operationally in al-Qaeda in Iraq, rose under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and remained loyal to the vision of an Islamic regime based on Sharia law even when he changed frameworks, names, and symbols. His prolonged detention by the Americans and rapid return to terrorist activity after his release reshaped a worldview of a long, patient ("Sabr". Arabic: صَبْرٌ) and multi-stage struggle: not an immediate revolution in the style of ISIS, but gradual penetration into the political, social, and state space.
In 2012, al-Sharaa founded the terrorist organization Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In 2017, he led the merger of Syrian jihadist groups into a new and unified terrorist group under the name Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). On November 27, 2024, HTS succeeded in toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime in less than two weeks in a broad surprise offensive, an event that marked a strategic turning point in the Syrian arena. Within 12 years, al-Sharaa succeeded in becoming a head of a state and altering his image in the eyes of the West and achieving recognition from the international community. This success indicates exceptional leadership abilities that combine military, political, and diplomatic strategies grounded in the principle of patience. This principle, borrowed by terrorist organizations from Islam and Arab culture, calls upon its believers to see themselves as part of a "long-term struggle".
What al-Sharaa understands well is the fundamental gap between ideology and international politics, and how this gap can be leveraged for his strategic objectives. The West, as he sees it, seeks, first and foremost, a rapid return to routine, reduction of violence, and cooperation with official institutions, even if this comes at the expense of strategic blindness to future threats.
The systematic harm to minorities, and in particular to the Druze in southern Syria, illustrates that the Salafi-jihadist ideology is not retreating but is being translated anew into a reality of governance. Testimonies of ethnic cleansing, public executions in the style of ISIS, rape of women and girls, siege of civilian populations, and desecration of religious symbols point to a clear continuity between HTS’s worldview and familiar terrorist operational patterns, similar to those seen in other arenas controlled by extremist organizations.
It should be acknowledged that in the short term al-Sharaa indeed provides the West with tactical utility: reducing Iranian influence in Syria and even confronting ISIS. However, this is not a value-based partnership. Al-Sharaa does not restrain ISIS out of loyalty to the West, but out of an internal struggle for control, legitimacy, and leadership of the Sunni-jihadist camp.
Therefore, any assessment that sees him as a "balancing force" is necessarily short-term. The West benefits from the outcome but ignores the intention. This is the same familiar strategic mistake: preference for temporary quiet over in-depth analysis of ideology, personality, and patterns of action of a radical leader.
The case of al-Sharaa constitutes a clear warning: this is the leader of a terrorist organization standing at the head of a state, a situation that may lead to the formation of prolonged strategic threats. Al-Sharaa is not a legitimate leader whose extremism is a matter of the past, and he will be able to use state mechanisms, economic resources, diplomacy, and a veneer of normalization to normalization to become a far more dangerous regional power.
As a leader, al-Sharaa stands out for self-discipline, organizational control, and a sharp ability to read the political and economic landscape. He has demonstrated willingness to forgo symbols, ties, and rhetoric, but not necessarily the internal ideological goal that has driven him for decades. The split from ISIS, and later the "disengagement" from al-Qaeda, are not definitive evidence of moderation but rather of strategic intelligence: early understanding that survival and accumulated power are achieved through local legitimacy, avoidance of frontal confrontation with the West, and the construction of governing institutions under a state framework.
It is precisely here that the failure in presenting him as a counterweight to the Shiite axis lies. Al-Sharaa is not building a modern Sunni nation-state that will balance Iran and Hezbollah, but rather to create a Sunni Islamic entity whose objective is to reshape the political order in Syria and subsequently in the region, according to his ideological perception.
The tactical alliance with Turkey illustrates this well: Ankara views al-Sharaa as a temporary tool to weaken the Kurds and curb Iran, and al-Sharaa views Turkey as a necessary patron for a transitional phase. There is no long-term strategic overlap here, but intersecting interests for a limited time. His past indicates that when a patron becomes a burden, it is replaced.
In regional terms, al-Sharaa’s rule rests on religious and jihadist legitimacy while adopting Western language opportunistically. This combination, radical ideology with a state screen, amplifies the level of risk.
Those who see him as a temporary solution to the Iranian problem may discover that in the new shaping of the Middle East, he is the next problem.
Leadership in Turkey - Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, uses modern rhetoric while drawing inspiration from the tradition of the Ottoman Caliphate and Sultanate. Erdogan sees himself as the leader of Sunni Islam in the Middle East, while striving for broader influence over the entire Muslim world, similar to the Ottoman Empire’s control over three continents. In several public speeches, he has raised the issue of Jerusalem as a central focal point of his expansionist aspirations.
For example, on December 22, 2024, during a speech he delivered in Turkey, the crowd called to him: "Mr. President, take us to Jerusalem". His response was: "Patience brings victory". The following day, on December 23, 2024, Devlet Bahçeli, Erdogan’s coalition partner, told a group of his supporters that the goal is for Turkey to conquer Jerusalem. On July 28, 2024, Erdogan threatened a military invasion of Israel: "Just as we entered Karabakh, just as we entered Libya, we may do the same to them (Israel). There is nothing we cannot do. We only have to be strong".
Abdullah Gul, a close friend and political ally of Erdogan, both part of the founding generation of the AKP (Justice and Development Party), said during a speech in 2003: "Turkey cannot be confined to Anatolia. Its full borders extend beyond the official boundaries. Turkey’s influence and interests transcend its geographic borders". When asked whether this symbolized a neo-Ottoman agenda, Gul replied: "Call it whatever you wish. The Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia are regions of direct interest to us. Turkey cannot be imprisoned within Anatolia."
Erdogan has effectively erased the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the secularist founder of the new Turkish government after World War I. Ataturk was responsible for the creation of a clear separation between religion and state, the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate and caliphate, Western civil legislation, universal education, and the promotion of a Turkish national identity in place of a religious-imperial identity. Ataturk focused on building state institutions and strengthening independence, rather than imperial ambitions or religious influence over other states. In contrast, Erdogan has moved in the opposite direction, strengthening the powers of his presidency, integrating religion into foreign and domestic policy, and promoting a Sunni-Islamic identity inspired by the Ottoman past as a tool for expanding Turkish influence in the region, including support for organizations such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Erdogan is the most dominant Turkish leader since Ataturk: since March 2003, first as Prime Minister and later, in 2014, as President, he has ruled Turkey for two consecutive decades, the longest period in modern Turkish history. The parliament, the judiciary, the military, and the media have gradually been subordinated to a centralized presidential regime in which the balance-of-power mechanisms have shifted and been undermined. He manages decision-making processes in a gradual and cumulative manner, relying on strategic patience and methodical maneuvers in stages. Rather than confronting centers of power directly and rapidly, he identifies points of weakness, accumulates public legitimacy, and advances in measured steps to shape a new reality before opponents can respond effectively. This pattern is evident in his approach to the judiciary, the military, the media, and even in the 2017, constitutional change: each move was presented as a specific adjustment or response to constraint, yet cumulatively it emerged as part of a long-term plan to concentrate authority.
This pattern combines a clear ideology with tactical pragmatism: Erdogan does not rush into confrontation if conditions are not ripe. He prefers to create the appropriate conditions, shape public consciousness, and wait for the opportune moment. The result is leadership that is not impulsive, but strives for long-term structural change through small steps, each of which justifies itself before the public, yet together they create a systemic transformation.
Erdogan sees himself as restoring Turkey’s status as a Muslim center of power after a century of as a secular republic that, in his view, distanced itself from its natural identity. The abolition of the sultanate and caliphate by Ataturk in 1922-1924 symbolized a conscious break from the imperial and religious legacy. The new Turkey was anchored in secularism and a westward orientation. Now, however, Erdogan has restored religion to the center of the public sphere, and the old elites, primarily military and judicial, have been replaced by a generation more loyal to the AKP.
Under Erdogan, Turkey operates with a dual strategic approach. On the one hand, its membership in NATO constitutes a natural restraint - the affiliation with a Western alliance obligates it to avoid aggressive actions that could lead to loss of legitimacy, sanctions, or tensions with other member states. In this sense, NATO provides the West with a pressure valve that prevents Turkey from acting freely and dangerously. On the other hand, it exploits the relative freedom provided by Western policy and international cover to develop an ideological affinity with radical Sunni Islam, host senior Hamas officials in country, allow them to manage investment portfolios worth billions, and publicly shield them.
In the past two years, Turkey has intensified its aggressive stance toward Greece and Cyprus concerning maritime rights and energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. The exchange of public threats increases the risk of military escalation, particularly in light of Ankara’s "Blue Homeland" initiative, which advances extensive sovereignty claims via Greece and Cyprus.
Turkey is also expanding its influence in the Middle East by positioning itself as a central actor in the Palestinian arena, particularly in relation to Hamas. While actors such as Qatar and Egypt previously attempted to influence the return of hostages, only Turkey succeeded in recent moves in exercising tangible influence, underscoring its power over the organization, at least in the financial realm. Turkey’s accession to the "Peace Council" in Gaza serves as a cover for this policy. Meanwhile, Erdogan has issued a directive to build shelters throughout the country, in all 81 provinces. Hence, a critical question - toward what confrontation is Turkey preparing, and with whom?
The Turkish political system currently does not produce a clear natural successor for "the day after Erdogan." However, there are two prominent figures who are possible candidates:
Hakan Fidan - Turkey’s Foreign Minister
Aged 57, holding a doctorate degree, and former head of Turkish intelligence, Fidan rose through the ranks and is referred to in the international media as "the political prince from the shadows". He is very close to Erdoğan and popular in Turkey, so in a scenario in which he takes power, Erdogan’s legacy would be preserved through a shared philosophy. At the beginning of February 2026, he stated that "his country may consider joining a regional nuclear arms race".
Ibrahim Kalin - Head of Turkish Intelligence
Aged 54, Erdogan’s close advisor and one of his closest allies, related through Emine, Erdogan’s wife, Kalin possesses an impressive intellectual background. He is articulate and versatile, yet sharp and aggressive and is considered ideologically committed at the highest level both to the neo-Ottoman idea and to devout Islamic values. In 2020, he responded to U.S. President Joe Biden, who attacked Erdogan: "The days when you could give orders to Turkey are over. If you still think you can try, please do. You will pay the price".
Turkey under Erdogan is developing in ways reminiscent of Iran after the Islamic Revolution: integration of a religious-Islamic revolution into governing institutions, proxy expansion, strategic proximity to Israel’s borders and Jerusalem, direct threats against Israel and the region (Greece and Cyprus), alongside open support for terrorist organizations, efforts at significant military expansion including air superiority, construction of shelters, and considerations of entering a nuclear race. Because Erdoğan is identified with the Muslim Brotherhood and is influenced by its ideology, he is part of the problem of regional instability, not the solution. A change in leadership to the likely alternatives will not restrain existing ambitions, since the potential successors are all his supporters and loyalists.
Leadership in Lebanon: Joseph Aoun
The Shiite axis in Lebanon, which suffered significant blows following Israeli actions and the new leadership in Syria, has not shown signs of total collapse, only temporary weakness. It has concurrently been replaced by a new Sunni Islamic axis pursuing geopolitical influence in the region.
On January 9, 2025, after a prolonged political crisis, former Lebanese Army Commander General Joseph Aoun, aged 62, from a Maronite Christian family, was elected President of Lebanon. Aoun received support from the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and even Israel, and secured 99 out of 128 votes in the parliamentary election held in Beirut.
Aoun's election followed two formative events led by Israel in the region. Most important was the pager attack on September 17–18, 2024, carried out by Mossad which was focused on degrading the Radwan elite force. According to Reuters, approximately 1,500 militants were rendered unfit for duty, and the organization’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, described it as a blow “unprecedented in history, to say the least.” The second decisive event was the elimination of Nasrallah himself on September 27, 2024, as part of Operation "New Order" conducted by the Israeli Air Force.
Until Nasrallah’s death, the Hezbollah-Iran axis dominated Lebanese politics. However, the pager attack and the death of Nasrallah precipitated a profound transition in domestic political leadership. Nevertheless, Hezbollah still holds five significant ministerial portfolios: Finance, Health, Labor, Administrative Development, and Environment. These constitute central tools serving the organization’s influence on the civilian population, enabling financial support, recruitment of operatives, loyalty-building, and corruption, effective tools for organizational rehabilitation.
In addition, Hezbollah’s funding from abroad continues to operate, even if partially damaged. One funding route includes drug cartels in Latin America, passing through West Africa and onward to Europe and the Middle East (illustrating the link between terrorist networks and criminal networks). Another route consists of charities, shell companies, and ostensibly legitimate firms operating trans-continentally. Hezbollah’s military capabilities continue to pose a threat to Israel and the region even after almost daily strikes by the Israeli Air Force, in light of repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement signed on November 27, 2024. Accordingly, a new military confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah appears closer than ever.
The Lebanese Army and parliament are not yet effectively dismantling Hezbollah’s weapons, while Israel enforces the ceasefire in practice through a policy of non-containment. In a possible confrontation with Iran, Hezbollah could launch thousands of missiles toward Israel’s home front and activate global terror networks awaiting Iran’s "day of command".
Aoun’s leadership has not proven to be strong nor decisive, as he has not effectively confronted Hezbollah in the manner that the West had hoped, despite receiving professional training in the West, including in the United States, and having participated in confrontations against terrorist organizations such as ISIS. Aoun is perceived as moderate, a leader focused on military strength, who does not emphasize sectarian background. However, his weakness is evident and may become a significant component in shifting internal and international dynamics if he does not transition from military leadership to political leadership while ensuring Hezbollah’s disarmament. Assessments that he may stabilize Lebanon do not currently withstand genuine scrutiny, given the possibility of renewed escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the organization’s military and economic strengthening.
The Palestinian Leadership
Gaza
Since 2007, Gaza has been controlled by the terrorist organization Hamas, which seized power from Fatah and Palestinian Authority leaders, threw them from rooftops, and won a majority in elections. For many years, the West regarded Hamas as a "moderate and preferable" actor compared to the Palestinian Authority, based on a security conception of preferring one enemy over another within risk management. Hamas’s invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023, despite extensive economic aid, exposed its true intentions: this is not a local economic or geographic conflict but a religious war. The Western assessment that the conflict was local and limited to the area alone proved incorrect, as Hamas ignited violent demonstrations worldwide with calls for a global intifada. During the "Iron Swords" war, military pressure and the targeting of Hamas’s leadership in Gaza and partially abroad led to the shaping of a new governing structure. Simultaneously, international initiatives led by President Trump, such as the "Peace Council", are intended to complete the final phase of shaping control in Gaza. Nevertheless, Hamas’s disarmament and Gaza’s demilitarization remain major challenges.
At the present, the identity of future Gaza leadership is unclear but depends on several actions: foremost the defeat of Hamas, secondly a deradicalization of the education system, and third the emergence of a Palestinian society willing to forego terrorism.
Absent these three components, any change will be at best temporary. Temporary IDF control of a security belt, pending the emergence of moderate local leadership and a genuine transformation of Palestinian society will be necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the coming years.
Investing hundreds of billions of dollars for reconstruction in Gaza without profound changes will only strengthen terrorist organizations. Therefore, reconstruction must occur only after the selection of a leadership that can guarantee that funds are directed properly and only after a deep process of de-radicalization recognizing the legitimacy of the State of Israel’s existence. The State of Israel received international recognition in the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan, as well as recognition from central powers including Britain and the United States. Continued contestation of these decisions by parts of Palestinian society constitutes an obstacle to regional progress. Hamas, though severely damaged, retains an organizational core capable of recovery and recruitment of thousands of new operatives from within the civilian society.
Mahmoud Abbas - The Palestinian Authority
Mahmoud Abbas, age 90, may soon be replaced both due to his age and due to the shaping of new Palestinian leadership under American guidance.
After the death of Yasser Arafat, Abbas was perceived as relatively moderate in the international arena, particularly in light of his support for the Oslo Accords process. He has served as President of the Palestinian Authority since 2005, as Chairman of the PLO, and as leader of Fatah, which were previously recognized as terrorist organizations.
The Historical Past
The notion that a leader with a past of involvement in terrorism may undergo full transformation and become a reliable political partner requires careful examination. This is particularly relevant when additional regional leaders with militant backgrounds are emerging, such as Ahmad al-Sharaa in Syria, whose depth of strategic transformation remains under scrutiny.
Abbas was a partner in the Oslo Accord process in the 1990s, an agreement that collapsed immediately after a wave of attacks against Israel. Abbas' background included extreme jihadist actions such as the establishment of the terrorist organization Black September (1970) and financing the massacre of athletes at the Munich Olympics (1972). His contacts with Ayatollah Khomeini also emphasize the real gap between his record and his partial declarations against terrorism.
Under his leadership, the terrorist organization Hamas strengthened and was elected in Gaza in 2006 by a majority of votes. A year later, Fatah activists loyal to Abbas were violently expelled from Gaza, some being thrown from the rooftops of government buildings. The lack of political and military control under Abbas' leadership led to widespread chaos including the October Seven massacre carried out by Hamas and the PA's continued weakness in Judea and Samaria, its ongoing financing of terrorist operatives and their families, and an educational system that incites terror. Currently, there is no clear successor to Abbas, but the central lesson from cases like Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that a leadership change without deep structural change does not generate long-term stability.
As long as Hamas maintains a military and social infrastructure in Gaza, genuine political unification with Judea-Samaria remains difficult to achieve. The high probability in the short term is the continuation of a de facto split, which is subject to change but depends on gradual actions. Unified leadership is possible only if a committed framework for disarmament, institutional reform, and mutual recognition is established. In the absence of these conditions, the split will continue, and Israel, through the IDF, will continue to bear the burden of security enforcement. The central challenge is not only the identity of the next leader but deep structural change within the Palestinian political and social system.
Leadership in Israel: Benjamin Netanyahu
Benjamin Netanyahu, age 76, is the incumbent Prime Minister of Israel and has served the longest tenure in the history of the State of Israel, spanning approximately two decades - positioning him as one of the longest-serving democratic leaders in the world.
The length of his tenure is key to understanding long-term policy patterns that have shaped the regional system: a consistent perception of the Iranian threat, a close strategic alliance with the United States, a global market economy, and cultivation of military-technological power.
Israel has positioned itself as a key security anchor for the free world in the Middle East. Its strategic credibility, military and technological capabilities, and consistent engagement on critical regional issues, including Iran and the Palestinian arena have established it as a pivotal actor shaping regional security and ensuring long-term stability for the United States and the West, a role that has been reinforced under Netanyahu’s leadership. This leadership has been marked by three dimensions: pursuit of a long-term security strategy; his global statesmanship thanks to English proficiency and Washington connections; and his survival skills as a politician.
Netanyahu's personality is characterized by attention to detail and sharp media-oriented thinking. With the surprise attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023, which escalated across seven arenas simultaneously – Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Judea and Samaria, Yemen, and Iran – Israel under Netanyahu changed the concept from defense to offense, taking the fighting into enemy territories in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria as part of a shared frontal border that posed a threat to the civilian rear. In practice, Israel demonstrated phenomenal capabilities in transitioning from a war of survival and existential threat to resurgence. This ability to move from the initial state of surprise and attack to its current position would not have been possible without Netanyahu’s personal capabilities and leadership, responsible for managing the war.
Netanyahu’s long tenure has allowed for rare strategic continuity in a changing Middle East. Operation Iron Blades and the direct confrontation with Iran in 2025 repositioned Israel from a state caught off guard to a proactive regional power. The question for the next decade is not merely security-related but political and may change soon as Israel enters an election year with uncertain results. Regardless, Netanyahu has become a historic figure in reshaping the 21st-century Middle East.
Leadership in Egypt: Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi
El-Sisi, age 71, has led Egypt since 2014 and is seen in the West as a moderate leader resisting extremist positions, with a military background as Defense Minister and senior commander in the army, closely connected to the Egyptian military establishment. He led the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood government in 2013 and has since established centralized rule based on intelligence and military power.
El-Sisi is known for attempting to maintain Egypt’s stability, even if through a centralized and sometimes repressive domestic policy, and for positioning Egypt as a regional player with influence throughout the Middle East. Given assessments that his rule will continue in the coming years, a deeper look at his personality in the strategic and operational sphere shows his inclinations, particularly with regard to Egypt-Israel relations.
El-Sisi's leadership has a Sunni coloration. He is known as a religious man. His wife wears a hijab, unlike previous presidents’ spouses. He is often photographed in prayers in mosques, and he proudly distributes the photographs. The Western image of him as a moderate leader constrained by American pressure must therefore be reexamined, especially in light of recent Israeli analyses. The idea of El-Sisi's Egypt as moderate may be misleading.
According to Lt. Col. (Res.) Eli Dekel, satellite imagery from open-source intelligence shows an unprecedented military build-up in Egypt, indicative of preparation for war. The peace agreement between Israel and Egypt was only achieved after the Yom Kippur War. Dekel argues that it is "a mistake to believe that Egypt intended peace, or even the sanitized and false concept called ‘cold peace.’ From the day Egypt signed the agreement, it began planning the next war against Israel". Hence the importance of noting El-Sisi's sharpened rhetoric. On October 8, 2023, the day after Hamas’s invasion of Israel, el-Sisi threatened Israel, saying that "approaching Gaza is a cause for war". Subsequently, el-Sisi threatened to annul the peace agreement with Israel.
It should be emphasized that El-Sisi does not adhere to the jihadist ideology of Hamas or ISIS. Egypt allows security cooperation and intelligence coordination with Israel and the United States. Nevertheless, the historical conflict with Israel remains embedded in Egyptian society and could reignite. Given a leadership change or a shift in policy by the current leader, alongside unprecedented Egyptian armament on its border with Israel, a strategic threat to Israel has emerged. The assessment of el-Sisi as an ideologically "moderate" leader is at best partial and requires constant evaluation.
Leadership in Jordan: Abdullah II - King of Jordan
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy, headed by Abdullah II, age 64, who holds concentrated power. In 1994, a formal peace agreement was signed between Israel and Jordan by leaders Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein, one of the first Arab leaders to meet with Israeli political figures. Since 1999, King Hussein’s son, Abdullah II, has ruled Jordan. Like his father, he maintains a good relationship with the U.S., the West, and Israel.
However, King Abdullah struggles to contain public hostility. Since the Hamas invasion of Israel, mass protests against Israel have occurred, and in November 2023, Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel. Despite the tension, security cooperation has been maintained during crises, such as Jordan’s assistance in defending against Iranian attacks in April and October 2024 and in June 2025. Israel provides Jordan with 100 million cubic meters of water annually, twice the volume stipulated in the 1990s agreement.
Nonetheless, because the border with Jordan is Israel’s longest, stretching 309 km, repeated breaches raise deep concern in Israel. Iran’s attempt to arm and ignite Judea and Samaria through Jordan, coupled with attempts to take control of the Jordanian government, require a reassessment of the Jordanian leadership’s ability to prevent Iranian influence from encroaching on its territory.
In 2014, during Operation Protective Edge between Israel and Hamas, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, personally put out the order to "arm Judea and Samaria like Gaza", aiming to equip it with missiles. Related threats include shooting attacks, infiltration of militants into Israeli settlements and cities, and intensive rocket fire across the Sharon region and central Israel, similar to Gaza before October 7, 2023.
Internal Israeli Police data reported 16 incidents of weapons smuggling along the Jordanian border in a single day, including rifles, pistols, M-16s, and sophisticated drone parts, allowing smugglers to deliver weapons deep into Israeli territory and Palestinian villages in Judea and Samaria, bypassing the need to breach the fence itself.
In recent years, Jordanian security forces have uncovered elements preparing weapons, training militants, and attempting to undermine the monarchy. In the event of a leadership change, whether natural or forced (hostile takeover), the open border between Israel and Jordan could be exposed to terrorism threats from Iran, hostile civilian elements within Jordanian society, and terrorist organizations generally. The border thus poses a threat to Israel not only due to criminal smuggling - but also because of the potential formation of a terrorist infrastructure similar to the October Seven model.
The relationship between Queen Rania and King Abdullah II is perceived as a significant personal and political partnership, with the queen clearly influencing his image and some of his policies. Her Palestinian origin affects her stance toward the Palestinian situation, especially in Gaza and Judea and Samaria.
The Queen has publicly criticized Israel on Instagram posts, where she has over 10 million followers, and at international conferences, accusing Israel of cruelty, attacks on hospitals, starving children, and harming aid seekers. At a conference in Germany, she compared Israeli public diplomacy to Nazi propaganda and criticized former Defense Minister Yoav Galant for calling Hamas "animals". Although she does not hold an official role in security policy, she wields significant informal influence that can shape the king’s decisions in sensitive situations, including conflicts or escalation Ing tensions between Israel and the Palestinians.
The potential successor to the King is determined by Jordanian royal succession law, based on the Hussein-Talal lineage, and is expected to include his eldest son, Crown Prince Khalid. Khalid, appointed directly by his father, is considered strong, well-educated, and militarily trained, having experience in security, foreign relations, and education. He has gained considerable familiarity with the state, indicating a high likelihood of inheritance.
His Western education, military training, and public influence networks, with full legitimacy from the government and military, give him experience in managing regional and international pressures, including relations with Israel and the U.S. Khalid is considered pro-Western, particularly toward the U.S. and European countries, due to his Western education and exposure to democratic values and strategic planning. However, he is also sensitive to pro-Palestinian Jordanian public sentiment, especially given his mother’s origin.
The Gulf States
The Gulf States, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have the potential to shape the future of the Middle East through normalization and strategic cooperation with the United States and Israel. Their political influence, economic clout, and the power of their leadership, particularly the personal authority of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), position them as key actors capable of fostering regional stability, creating economic opportunities, and mitigating conflicts.
At the same time, developments in Saudi Arabia signal potential challenges. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has recently indicated that normalization could be conditional upon the establishment of a Palestinian state. In parallel, he has shown signs of warming relations with Turkey under President Erdogan, an actor ideologically aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdogan’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, and the two leaders’ declaration of strategic cooperation, may signaling a potentially significant regional realignment.
Despite current tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both leaders represent a younger generation that has successfully implemented internal reforms, advancing modernization and engagement with the West, in contrast to the more conservative policies of their predecessors. While Mohammed bin Zayed’s economic initiatives are critical and far-reaching, the broader stability of the region will be primarily shaped by the security and political posture of Mohammed bin Salman, his alignment with or distance from the West, Israel, and other regional actors, demonstrating that economic progress alone cannot determine the region’s future.
A Comparative Analysis of MBS and MBZ
The Gulf States are currently experiencing a generational shift in leadership, with younger leaders reshaping governance, regional influence, and internal reforms. In Saudi Arabia, the Crown Prince represents a bold, ambitious, and centralized leadership, determined to modernize the kingdom and consolidate authority. His style is assertive, charismatic, and often uncompromising, enabling significant social and economic reforms, including curbing the religious police, advancing women’s rights, and expanding civil freedoms. However, his concentration of power and authoritarian tendencies limits diplomatic flexibility, particularly regarding normalization with Israel, and often distances Saudi Arabia from the West.
In contrast, the United Arab Emirates under President Mohammed bin Zayed demonstrates a more calculated and pragmatic approach. MBZ balances strategic modernization with long-term regional engagement, emphasizing stability, strong security institutions, and proactive partnerships. His personality is strategic, disciplined, and forward-looking, allowing him to pursue landmark initiatives, including the 2022 normalization agreement with Israel, grounded in security and technological considerations rather than ideology. By combining domestic control, generational planning, and strategic diplomacy, MBZ has strengthened the UAE’s regional influence while maintaining internal stability.
Both leaders reflect a younger generation that diverges sharply from the more conservative policies of their predecessors. While MBS is focused on reshaping the rules and centralizing power in his hands, often using the Palestinian issue as leverage in regional diplomacy, MBZ emphasizes measured leadership, distributing power within the system and prioritizing predictability and long-term stability.
In sum, the personal traits and leadership styles of MBS and MBZ are central to understanding the Gulf’s role in regional affairs. MBS’s assertive, reform-oriented, and centralized model drives internal transformation but creates unpredictability externally. MBZ’s pragmatic, strategic, and stability-focused approach facilitates long-term partnerships and diplomatic flexibility, demonstrating how generational leadership and personal authority shape both domestic reform and regional influence.
The demographic composition of Saudi Arabia and the UAE plays a crucial role in shaping the two leadership approaches. In Saudi Arabia, the majority of citizens adhere to Sunni Islam and are strongly connected to its traditions, with the kingdom hosting Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina. This demographic and religious context constrains MBS, making him attentive to societal and religious sensitivities, reinforcing his centralized authority, cautious policymaking, and careful approach to regional and international matters, including normalization with Israel.
In contrast, in the UAE, citizens constitute a small minority within a population dominated by expatriates and foreign workers. This allows MBZ far greater freedom to implement pragmatic, long-term strategic policies, pursue international partnerships, and normalize relations with Israel without facing significant domestic ideological pressures.
These demographic realities directly shape how each leader balances internal stability, regional ambitions, and diplomatic opportunities, highlighting why MBS’s approach is more centralized and cautious, while MBZ’s is strategic, measured, and flexible.
Conclusion
The Middle East is in a period of heightened tension, where the conflict around Israel is not dissipating but reshaping and reorganizing. As of this writing, the outcome of the attacks of February 28 remains unclear. The Shiite axis led by Iran remains a danger, no matter how degraded it has been, while a radical Sunni axis, including threats from Turkey, is emerging. Lebanese leadership is currently failing to restrain Hezbollah. Syrian leadership operates under Turkish auspices and includes a leader with an extreme Islamist background whose loyalists have integrated into the new government and army. In Gaza, a technocratic governance model supported by Turkey and Qatar is emerging, ideologically aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. In Jordan and Egypt, leadership is relatively weak, and public opinion remains hostile toward Israel despite the 1979 and 1994 peace agreements. Ultimately the regional order depends on the United States, whose policies and actions will determine the region’s reshaping.
If the regime of the ayatollahs persists in Iran, it will continue to feed, fund, and direct regional and international proxies. If it is replaced, a new Middle East may emerge. If it survives, in whatever form, overlapping influences from different extremist Islamic currents, Iranian and Turkish, may create the potential for a new "strategic chokehold". Any assumption that the rise of one radical element over another will solve the problem is mistaken. Likewise, the assumption that a singular leadership change will automatically produce regional change is a misconception. Leaders can escalate or contain situations but do not operate in a vacuum. The depth of radicalization within societies is the decisive variable: Arab public opinion, not just leaders and elites, shapes the boundaries within which leaders operate.
The Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, demonstrate how generational leadership and demographic realities shape regional stability. Mohammed bin Salman’s centralized and religion-sensitive approach contrasts with Mohammed bin Zayed’s pragmatic and flexible model, highlighting that the internal composition of each society directly influences the leaders’ decision-making and the potential for regional cooperation. Understanding these differences is essential for assessing the prospects of long-term normalization, strategic partnerships, and the broader security landscape in the Middle East.
Under Mojtaba’s new leadership of Iran, the question will remain whether Iran will continue to fire on over 11 countries and entities in the region as it has done so far, including: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Azerbaijan, and even Turkey, Cyprus, and others. The changes that stand before our eyes in the Middle East may directly affect Gaza and Trump’s 21-step plan and the expansion of normalization with moderate Sunni states that witness Iranian aggression and the live Shia-radical threat on their soil: Will Saudi Arabia now move closer to normalization with Israel and the United States? Israel’s positioning by Trump and the Secretary of War, Pete Geshath, as a strong and important ally in the region, has significantly elevated Israel’s status on the regional and global stage. Regional countries are examining the cooperation and the strong alliance that is strengthening between Israel and the United States, and the positive process that may develop is the potential for creating regional peace and calm, in which the State of Israel will also be directly involved.
Danny Ayalon is Former Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, Member of the Knesset, and Ambassador to the United States. Moran Alaluf is an Analyst on Middle East Affairs and Counterterrorism, and a Specialist on Iran and Hezbollah.
