- Middle East
- International Affairs
- US Foreign Policy
- Determining America's Role in the World
Abstract
Ahmad al-Sharaa has declared himself both interim president and prime minister of a supposedly “inclusive” government. He appears to be appealing to the West, but his power remains authoritarian. Beneath the facade of institutions, sheikhs and warlords truly hold the reins of the country, effectively thwarting any possibility of a genuine democratic shift. Al-Sharaa's goal appears to be the establishment of an authoritarian Islamic republic in Syria, solely anchored in the conservative Sunni Arab community. As a result, ethnic and religious minorities are either subjugated or forced to leave, and secularists of all faiths will be affected.
In March 2025, Ahmad al-Sharaa officially became both interim president and prime minister of an “inclusive” government. He assigned four small ministerial positions to members of minority groups, as the West had requested. A five-year transition period is planned to draft a constitution and organize democratic elections. This will fulfil the requirements of Resolution 2254[1] of 2015, a prerequisite for lifting Western sanctions and gaining international legitimacy.
This strategy proved successful, as he was greeted with great fanfare at the Élysée Palace by Emmanuel Macron on May 7, 2025, and by Donald Trump during his visit to Riyadh on May 14, 2025. Additionally, during the United Nations General Assembly, the Syrian president was allowed to address the assembly, a privilege not granted to a Syrian president since 1967.
A puppet Parliament
The early October parliamentary elections were celebrated by advocates of the new administration as a significant stride towards democracy. However, the reaction from Western diplomatic circles was more reserved. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Union did not issue any statements on their websites regarding the elections.
The circumstances surrounding the election of parliamentary members were far from inspiring: a mere 6,000 voters, handpicked by the regime, chose 140 representatives from among themselves[2]. However, only 119 seats were filled, with the Druze-majority province of Suwayda and the Kurdish-dominated northeastern region being barred from participating. Consequently, the parliament that emerged was predominantly male and Arab, with a large Sunni majority. Women occupy just 4% of parliamentary seats, while individuals from underrepresented groups account for less than 15% of the total[3]. However, these groups make up at least 30% of the overall resident population. The president has the power to appoint one third of parliament (70 members). As of this writing, al-Sharaa has not yet finalized his decision. It is hoped that he will tip the scales towards underrepresented groups, such as women and minorities, who were negatively affected by the election. However, the assembly will only have an advisory role and no legislative power. This allows the Syrian leader to convey an image of compliance with the stipulations of Resolution 2254.
The Influence of the Sheikhs
The Ba’athist regime’s leadership has been completely overhauled in the state bureaucracy at all levels. In the vast majority of cases, it is “people from Idlib” who govern in the areas under the direct control of Damascus (which, for the moment, excludes the Kurdish areas and the Jabal Druze). They are, of course, all Sunnis, the sect of the ruling power. They may come from Idlib or another part of the country, but what they have in common is that they experienced life in that city during the years of conflict. The province of Aleppo is a notable exception, since it is under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood and the former “Syrian National Army” (Turkish proxy). Although this pro-Turkish militia alliance was incorporated into the newly formed Syrian Army, its leadership remains subservient to Ankara. Ahmad al-Sharaa is forced to cede power to them in Aleppo and in the areas where this militia is still stationed (Afrin, Tel Abyad, and Ras Al Ain).
Across the nation, clans are engaged in open conflict. The administration is unable to enforce its jurisdiction. It limits itself to monitoring the primary highways and the main cities, while allowing regional chieftains to maintain control over the hinterlands. Despite this, they continue to attempt to appoint a representative, called the “sheikh”, to these local leaders. The “sheikh” holds significant influence, not only on a spiritual level, but also in politics. Despite a lack of formal education, he is highly regarded by the troops for his dedication and courageousness, having been among those who fought alongside Ahmad al-Sharaa. These are the individuals who truly wield power at the local level and even within the central administration. Ministers must seek the sheikh’s approval for their decisions.
The sheikh governs according to the principles of Sharia law and the dictates of Ahmad al-Sharaa. This is similar to the Baathist regime, where all ministers and directors were overseen by an assistant from the mukhabarat (intelligence services) and had limited freedom of action. The sheikhs are the guardians of local authority and justice, but they do not necessarily care about fairness. For example, anyone who brings up the issue of their home having been seized by individuals connected to the new regime is met with indifference. It is also futile to seek help if a loved one is kidnapped: the sheikh is fully aware of the criminal acts committed by those under his control.
Consequently, Syrians are losing faith in the institutions created by the “liberators” of December 2024. This is significantly affecting the economic climate and national unity. Minorities have been the initial casualties of the emerging Islamic government.
In Syria, separatist sentiment is widespread among minorities
The Alawite and Druze communities, traumatized by massacres in March and July 2025, and continued daily insecurity, demand “taqsim” (division of the country). Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who has emerged as the political figurehead for the Syrian Druze (3% of the population), is proposing the establishment of an independent Druze state, anchored in their ancestral homeland. This proposal may resonate with Israel, which, despite potential peace agreements with Syria, remains committed to exerting influence during negotiations with Damascus.
Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal, who identifies as the representative of the Alawite community (10% of the population), shares the same desire. However, unlike the Druze, the Alawites face a lack of external support and internal political infrastructure to organize a revolt comparable to the Druze. Additionally, the people do not have confidence in Assad’s former officers to lead a rebellion and then govern an Alawite state. In March 2025, the former military officers, who had formed armed groups[4], were unable to prevent the massacres. Their level of corruption is well known. Additionally, the Alawite territory is not homogenous as is that of the Druze around al-Sweida. In the coastal area, the city of Latakia predominantly consists of a Sunni population, with the surrounding regions to the north and east also being largely Sunni. Ahmad al-Sharaa can rely on support from the substantial Sunni communities in Jableh, Banias, and Tartus. In Syria’s interior, the Alawites are on the defensive. The war has weakened their numbers, leaving them vulnerable to the Sunni tide, which is driving them from the region. This critical situation could trigger an Alawite uprising, but its consequences would be just as dire as those of the recent one.
The Demise of the Kurdish Dream
Ahmad al-Sharaa wants to completely dissolve the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria[5] (AANES) and reincorporate the Northeast under his control. On March 10, 2025, Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi signed an integration agreement with the Syrian president, under the influence of American diplomacy. However, negotiations have dragged on because the Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) and especially the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) have refused to join the new Syrian army individually. Kurds (12% of the population) have been worried they would share the fate of the Druze and Alawites and despite many verbal assurances of inclusion from Ahmad al-Sharaa, no tangible progress has been achieved. Mazloum Abdi demanded guarantees to protect the AANES, taking as an example the Iraqi constitution, which allows for the creation of a quasi-Kurdish state through the Kurdistan Regional Government centered in Erbil. Then in January 2026, Ahmad al-Sharaa launched an assault on the northeast. His troops seized the Euphrates Valley in a single day. The Sunni Arab population, eager to be free of Kurdish rule, welcomed them. The Kurdish enclaves of Kobani and the Northeast around Qamishli were spared, but only temporarily; historically they had countered on protection from American troops. However, Washington evacuated al-Tanef military base on February 12, and the last two bases in northern-eastern Syria will follow soon. The Kurds are left unprotected.
Islamic fundamentalism and centralization
Over the next five years, if Ahmad al-Sharaa fulfils his pledge to organize elections and establish a new constitution, the diverse cultural heritage of the country will become a distant memory. The process of ethnic and sectarian homogenization has significantly weakened minorities as well as secularists, benefiting the new Syrian regime’s social base: the conservative Sunni Arab population. If he succeeds in unifying various Islamist militias under his leadership, he will oversee a rigid political system in which sheikhs will hold power at every level of the bureaucracy. This future Syria will likely be highly dependent on Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, respectively, in terms of military, economic, and diplomatic power. Internally, it will have replicated the authoritarianism of the former Ba’athist regime. However, unless the Syrian economy recovers and the competing Islamic groups stop hostilities, the country may yet splinter into competing faction, similar to what transpired in Libya.
Fabrice Balanche is on the faculty of Geography at the University of Lyon. He was previously a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution and is currently adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His last book, Lessons from the Syrian Crisis (in French), won the 2024 Geopolitics Prize from the French Ministry of Defense.
[1] The UN Security Council unanimously adopted this resolution, demanding a ceasefire. It also called for a meeting of the parties, to be held under UN auspices, with a view to starting formal negotiations. It provides for free and fair elections under UN supervision, as well as a political transition. Resolution 2254 serves as the legal foundation for the European Union and the United States when it comes to imposing or lifting sanctions.
[2] “Syria’s First Post-Assad Parliament: Political Restructuring in a Region of Uncertainties”, ISPI, October 9, 2025, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/syrias-first-post-assad-parliament-political-restructuring-in-a-region-of-uncertainties-219475
[3] https://x.com/TheSyriaReport/status/1975921901739405672
[4] Miqdad Fatiha, a former commander of the Republican Guard, leads the Syrian People’s Resistance Movement, in the coastal region.
[5] The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) is an autonomous political entity that emerged in northeastern Syria in 2012. It is primarily led by Kurds but also includes Arabs and Assyrians.
