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It is hardly surprising that the People's Republic of China (PRC) reacted negatively to the reelection of Chen Shui-bian as president of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Leading up to the March 20, 2004, election, Beijing adopted a careful, low-key approach, in contrast to its missile launches in 1996 and its shrill threats in 2000. But there was little doubt that it hoped Chen would be defeated by the pan-blue coalition of the Kuomintang (KMT) and People First Party (PFP). In the run-up to Chen's victory, Beijing had once again failed to influence events in Taiwan. Still, the narrow margin of victory, the recount, the court challenge, and hopes that Chen might adopt an accommodating stance on cross-Strait relations in his May 20 inauguration speech all apparently combined to stay Beijing's hand. Now that Chen's speech has been delivered, assessed, and found wanting, however, high-level officials, media commentators, and "track two" scholars are pressing a harsher, more confrontational line. The revised approach will have consequences both for China's relations with the United States and perhaps on the domestic front as well.

Attention in PRC media to the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo in the 18 months since the 16th Party Congress has illuminated aspects of that body's operating procedures and its members' roles. In particular, recent media reporting has further clarified the Politburo's meeting schedule and agenda, as well as the division of responsibilities for policy supervision among its membership. There have also been rare glimpses of the "leadership small groups"—the informal task forces that coordinate implementation of Politburo decisions throughout the party, state, and other hierarchies in China's political order. A previous article in China Leadership Monitor (issue 9, winter 2004) assessed aspects of the Politburo's schedule in the context of broader party procedural reforms inaugurated under Hu Jintao's leadership. This article complements and extends that analysis.